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[Ain underground economy has developed. It is these big cash
spenders that IRS shouldprosecute quickly, with a vengeance, and be
certain that they are behind bars where they won't need to worry about
spending tens of thousands of dollars anymore. We frequently hear
from taxpayers that IRS is relentlessly pursuing them without listening
to the whole story. Well, here is one bunch that IRS should relentlessly
pursue because there is no other side to the story. The IRS must be
vigilant in prosecuting those operating in the underground economy
because the stakes are so high. We cannot afford to lose the confidence
ofhard-working, taxpayingpeople in our Federaltax system. We must
do everything possible to ensure that everyone pays theirfair share of
taxes.'
This controversyfeatures an old-fashioned tug of war Pulling in
one direction is the Internal Revenue Service which, for easily
understandablereasons, is intent on learning the identity of persons
who pay large legalfees in cash. Pulling in the opposite direction is a
consortium consisting of two lawyers and three bar associations
(appearingas amici curiae) which,for equally understandablereasons
(fearing inter alia that disclosure may spurprosecution), is intent on
safeguardingthe identity of clients who pay in cash.2

1. Effectiveness of the U.S. Department of the Treasury Programs to Address Money
Laundering and Related Federal Tax Evasion: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House ofRepresentatives Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1992) [hereinafter
Hearing:Effectiveness of TreasuryPrograms (Statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle).
2. United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 965 (lst Cir. 1995).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to unearth and tax the "underground economy,"
Congress has enacted a number of laws that focus on identifying large
commercial cash transactions This legislation resulted from wellpublicized accounts of drag dealers and other tax scofflaws who paid no
income tax yet lived luxurious lifestyles often complete with expensive
automobiles and yachts. These reporting provisions have become part of
this nation's so-called "war on drugs." While the goal of eliminating
drugs from our streets is unquestionably laudable,4 the reporting
provisions have cast such a wide net that their enforcement has raised
serious ethical and policy issues.
The legislative efforts to combat money laundering turn on
identifying suspicious financial transactions and following the trail of
money. Thus, the Bank Secrecy Act requires banks and other financial
institutions to report cash deposits or withdrawals of over $10,000.'
Moreover, those engaged in a trade or business must provide the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") with the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of any person who engages in a cash transaction in an
amount exceeding $10,000.6 The latter disclosure must be filed on Form
8300, 7 which has recently engendered a great deal of controversy in the
legal profession. Because lawyers are engaged in a "trade or business"'
and therefore within the literal scope of the provisions, the IRS has
consistently taken the position that lawyers are required to report the
names of clients who pay their legal fees in cash. Many lawyers, fearing
that reporting such information would expose their clients to both
criminal and civil prosecutions, have fied incomplete Forms 8300; they
report the receipt of cash, but refuse to provide the payors' names. These

3. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended
and revised at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5326 (1994)); Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106,40 Stat. 411
(1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1988)).
4. The authors join others who have criticized the reporting provisions, not for their policy
goals, but rather the means by which the goals are achieved. See, eg., Patricia T. Morgan, Money
Laundering, The InternalRevenue Service, and Enforcement Priorities,43 FLA. L. REv. 939, 940
(1991) ("At a time in our history when the war on drugs and those who launder the proceeds of
illegal activity capture international attention, one hesitates to suggest that aggressive enforcement
of laws designed to thwart such illegal activities is inappropriate." (footnote omitted)).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994).
6. I.R.C. § 60501 (1994).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.60501 (1994).
8. United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir. 1991).
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lawyers argue that disclosing such information would both violate the
attorney-client privilege and interfere with their clients' Sixth Amendment right to counsel.9 As the IRS and the Department of Justice have
pursued these cases through summons enforcement actions, trial courts
have differed as to whether disclosure of the information is required.
Some have required full disclosure of client names, while others have
held that attorneys have an ethical obligation to withhold client identity
as long as the fact of payment is reported. The issue awaits possible
resolution by the Supreme Court or perhaps Congress.10
Until the controversy is ultimately resolved, however, attorneys may
now be subject to differing ethical obligations depending on the
jurisdiction in which they practice. More importantly, in those jurisdictions requiring disclosure, the attorney-client privilege has become
something of a casualty in the drive to attack money laundering.
Attorneys are forced to provide information which will in all likelihood
lead to the indictment of their own clients. In a sense, lawyers are now
being drafted as informants against clients who pay in cash. The
pervasive nature of this issue was recently demonstrated in the case of
a newly appointed federal district court judge who successfully defended
her refusal to disclose the name and social security number of her
client."
This Article examines the current controversy surrounding the use
of IRS Form 8300 in the context of the attorney-client privilege. It
argues that there is no justification in the case law for permitting
attorneys to avoid disclosing client identity or fee information. It also
shows that the IRS's regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute are
generally consistent with the statutory language, even if they are not fully
in accord with congressional intent. It is argued, therefore, that while
section 60501 has a detrimental effect on attorney-client relations, the
only available remedy at this point is for Congress to reconsider the
statute with an eye toward providing an exclusion for attorneys.
Part I begins by discussing the money laundering provisions which

9. See, e.g., United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Sindel,
53 F.3d 874, 875 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 188 (1994); Goldberger,935 F.2d at 506; United States v. Monnat, 853 F. Supp. 1301,

1305 (D. Kan. 1994).
10. Joseph Wharton, Form 8300 Exception, A.B.A. J., April 1995, at 28; see also Sheryl
Stratton, Lawyer Cash Reporting, Tolled Statutes of Limitations Top Recent Litigation Overview, 95
TAX NOTES TODAY 42-6 (March 2, 1995).
11. Wharton, supra note 10, at 28 (detailing the case involving Judge Nancy Gertner of the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts); see also Gertner,65 F.3d 963.
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preceded section 60501 and then focuses on the reporting provisions of
that section. Part II examines the conflicting opinions rendered by the
various federal courts and the implications for attorneys who refuse to
disclose client identity. Part H presents a tax analysis of section 60501,
with a particular focus on the IRS's administration of the reporting
provisions. It is clear that the focus of these provisions seems to have
drifted from attacking the underground economy to becoming a primary
tool in the war against money laundering and criminal activity in general.
Part I also considers whether section 6050I's use for purposes other
than uncovering unreported income is legitimate. The Article concludes
by suggesting a means by which the provisions of the statute might be
interpreted and amended to avoid doing damage to the principles
underlying the attorney-client privilege.
II.

LEGISLATIVE ATTACK ON MONEY LAUNDERING AND
UNREPORTED INCOME

A.

Money LaunderingProvisions

"'Money laundering' is the process by which one conceals the
existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then
disguises that income to make it appear legitimate."' 2 Laundered money
may originate as illegal or "dirty" money, such as drug trafficking
proceeds. Money may also start out clean and later become dirty as a
result of tax evasion. 3 For example, the worker who receives money
"under the table" has earned it through legal means, although the failure
to report the income for tax purposes constitutes a crime. 4 Notwithstanding the legality of the funds' source, the money launderer seeks to

12. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984). For a thorough analysis of the money laundering
provisions, see generally Thomas M. DiBiagio, Money Launderingand DrugTrafficking: A Question
of Understandingthe Elements of the Crime and the Use of CircumstantialEvidence, 28 U. RICH.
L. REV. 255 (1994); G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the '90's, 27 AM. CRIM.
L. R.EV. 149 (1989); Symposium, TheAnti-MoneyLaunderingStatutes: Where From Here?,44 ALA.
L. REV. 657 (1993).
13. Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering,and the FederalCriminalLaw: The Crime
of Structuring Transactions,41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 290 (1989).
14. The Internal Revenue Code imposes imprisonment of up to five years and a fine up to
$100,000 upon "[a]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by [the Internal Revenue Code]." I.R.C. § 7201 (1994); see also id. § 7203 (willful failure
to file return or pay tax).
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hide the money from the taxing authorities and to transform it into a
usable form of currency.
Because criminals need to launder their illicit gains in order to enjoy
them, money-laundering often becomes a symbiotic component of the
underlying criminal activity:
[L]aundering is harmful because it allows the underlying criminal
activity to thrive. Drug sales, gambling, or other crimes that generate
cash are pointless if the cash cannot be invested or spent.... Thus,
success of the criminal venture depends on laundering. Efficient
laundering renders
the underlying crime lucrative, and therefore
5
perpetuates it.'
In enacting its first anti-money laundering provision in 1970,
Congress focussed on this connection between money laundering and
criminal activity:
Criminals deal in money--cash or its equivalent. The deposit and
withdrawal of large amounts of currency or its equivalent (monetary
instruments) under unusual circumstances may betray a criminal
activity. The money in many of these transactions may represent
anything from the proceeds of a lottery racket to money for the bribery
of public officials.
Law enforcement agency representatives have strongly urged
legislation which would require reports of such transactions by the
institution involved as well as the individuals concerned .... These
reports may be of considerable value to 1law
enforcement agencies in
6
criminal investigations and prosecutions.
The ensuing legislation centered on identifying large cash transactions that flowed through banks and other financial institutions. The Bank
Secrecy Act requires banks and other domestic financial institutions to
report financial transactions involving more than $10,000 in currency on
a Currency Transaction Report ("CTR").17 Failure to comply with the
provisions of the Act carries civil and criminal sanctions.'

15. Welling, supra note 13, at 291 (footnote omitted).
16. H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970).
17. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 121(b), 123(a), 84 Stat. 1114, 1116-17
(1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1994)). "It is the purpose of this section to require
the maintenance of appropriate types of records by insured banks in the United States where such
records have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or
proceedings." Id. § 101(a)(2), 84 Stat. at 1115.

18. Act of Oct. 26 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§205(b), 209-210, 84 Stat. 1114, 1120-21
(1970) (codified at 31 §§ 1054, 1058-59 (1994)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss3/2

6

Harrington and Lustig: IRS Form 8300: The Attorney-Client Privilege and Tax Policy Becom

19961

IRS FORM 8300

The Bank Secrecy Act's money laundering provisions initially
proved ineffective because of poor compliance and enforcement.1 9 A
large number of transactions escaped detection because money launderers
were able to "structure" transactions to fall under the $10,000 threshold.
The most common method of structuring was by "smurfing," which
involved having one or more couriers make deposits to numerous banks
of less than $10,000 each.2 The structuring possibilities could be
increased by using a number of banks, branches, and teller stations.2"
The response to the problems of structuring was twofold. First, the
Treasury amended its reporting regulations to address problems of
aggregating branches of banks.' In addition, Congress enacted the socalled "anti-smurfing" statute which criminalized structured transactions." Violations of the anti-structuring provisions are now punished
by civil and criminal fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture.2 4
B.

The UndergroundEconomy and the Tax Gap

Money laundering is not the only problem that the currency
reporting legislation sought to attack. Congress also saw the need to
combat the growth of the "underground economy," which is comprised
of "those persons outside the tax system who deal in currency., 21 While
money launderers are certainly participants in the underground economy,
the term is also used to describe other citizens who earn money legally
but do not file tax returns. The integrity of the United States' tax system
depends on the voluntary compliance of its citizens. The underground
economy, whether it be a drug dealer or a construction worker working
"under the table," threatens the integrity of the system because it puts
increased pressure on those who comply with the tax laws.
The underground economy is also one of the major contributors to

19. Welling, supra note 13, at 295.
20. The term "smurfing" refers to the popular blue cartoon characters, to whom the depositors

were likened. Id. at 297.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
31 C.F.R. § I03.22(a) (1995).
31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
Id. §§ 5321-5322.

25. Gerald A. Feffer et al., Proposals to Deter and Detect the UndergroundCash Economy,
in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: A REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION OF TAXATION INVITATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 293 (1983); see also Michael C. Durst, American Bar
Ass'n See. of Taxation & American Bar Found., Report of the Second Invitational Conference on
Income Tax Compliance,42 TAX LAW. 705 (1988) (discussing problems of income tax compliance
in the United States and policy recommendations).
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the "tax gap." The tax gap is defined as "the difference between what
taxpayers owe and what they do not voluntarily pay., 26 Although the
tax gap is difficult to measure with precision, recent estimates place the
gap at approximately seventeen percent of the federal income taxes due
annually, or between $110 billion and $127 billion for 1992.27 Because
the increasing emphasis on deficit reduction results in lower tax revenues,
closing the tax gap assumes greater importance. 8 Congress is currently
reluctant to either increase tax rates or increase the types of activities
subject to taxation; thus, finding additional revenues is of great
importance.
Congress' attempts to close the tax gap include programs that seek
to increase the accuracy of both reported income as well as unreported
income through document reporting and matching programs. For
example, interest and dividend income received by taxpayers is reported
by the payor banks and corporations, respectively, and is compared by
the IRS with the amounts reported on taxpayer returns. Moreover,
"backup withholding" is required in certain circumstances to assure tax
collection. These types of reporting and withholding systems are not
effective with the underground economy, however, because the unreported income is not invested in legal, income producing vehicles.
C. The Enactment of Section 60501
With the burgeoning budget deficit of the 1980's, Congress sought
increased tax revenues to help reduce the deficit.2 9 At the same time,
Congress continued to be concerned with the underground economy and
its effect on the tax system:
[A]pproximately 80 percent of the revenue lost through noncompliance
is attributable to the underreporting of income. For 1981, the IRS
estimates that taxpayers filing returns failed to report $134 billion of
income and nonfilers failed to report $115 billion. This $250 billion of
26. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE JOINT COMMrrEE ON
TAXATION, REDUCING THE TAX GAP: RESULTS OF A GAO SPONSORED SYMPOSIUM (GAO/GGD-95157 1995).
27. Id. In contrast, the GAO approximated that the tax gap for 1973 was between $28 billion
and $32 billion. Id.
28. Arguably, compliance would increase if the citizenry perceived the tax system as fairer.
Moreover, compliance would also increase under a European styled value added tax ("VAT")
because tax would be collected on all purchases of consumables. Alan Schenk, Choosing the Form
ofa Federal Value-Added Tax: Implicationsfor State and Local Retail Sales Taxes, 22 CAP. U. L.
REv. 291, 296 (1993).
29. Morgan, supra note 4, at 953-55.
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underreporting reduced tax receipts by an estimated $55 billion.
Unreported income connected with illegal activities was estimated to
result in an additional $9 billion of lost revenue. The committee believes
that reportingon the spending of large amounts of cash will enable the
Internal30Revenue Service to identijy taxpayers with large cash
incomes.
As part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, therefore, Congress
enacted section 60501 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), which
provides, in part, as follows:
§ 60501. Returns relating to cash received in trade or business, etc.
(a) Cash receipts of more than $10,000
Any person(1) who is engaged in a trade or business, and
(2) who, in the course of such trade or business, receives
more than $10,000 in cash in 1 transaction (or 2 or more
related transactions),
shall make the return described in subsection (b) with respect to such
transaction (or related transactions) at such time as the Secretary may
by regulations prescribe.
(b) Form and manner of returns

A return is described in this subsection if such return(1) is in such form as the Secretary may prescribe,
(2) contains(A) the name, address, and TIN [taxpayer identification
number] of the person from whom the cash was received,
(B) the amount of cash received,
(C) the date and nature of the transaction, and
(D)
such other information as the Secretary may pre3

scribe.

1

This provision originated from a recommendation by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and was clearly modeled after
the Bank Secrecy Act provisions.32 Given the current turmoil surround30. S. REP. No. 300, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1983) (emphasis added).

31. I.R.C. § 60501(a), (b) (1994).
32. Morgan, supranote 4, at 941. The AICPA's report reflected the ineffectiveness of the then

currency reporting provisions:
The Federal Reserve Board requires that banks report certain large deposit or withdrawals
of cash, but it is our understanding that this requirement is generally ignored. The tax
authorities should either initiate their own reporting requirement or prevail upon the
Federal Reserve Board to enforce the current requirement more vigorously. All businesses
should be required to reportcash transactions in excess of some reasonable threshold,

such as $3,000 or $5,000.
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ing the enforcement of section 60501, remarkably little fanfare attended
its enactment.3 3
D. Operation of Section 60501
Section 60501 requires that any person engaged in a trade or
business make a report to the IRS of any cash transaction that exceeds
$10,000. 34 This provision also requires that the IRS be furnished with
payor's name, address, and taxpayer identification number, as well as a
description of the nature of the transaction. The required return under
section 60501 is made on "Form 8300." 3" Completion of Form 8300
requires extensive information about the payor, including name, address,
and taxpayer identification number.36
The recipient of the cash must also verify the payor's identity by
examining a driver's license or other form of identification "normally
acceptable as a means of identification when cashing or accepting
checks. 37 In the case of an alien, this would require the examination
of a passport or alien identification card.3"
IRS regulations broadly set forth transactions subject to the section
60501 reporting provisions. These "include (but are not limited to) a sale
of goods or services; a sale of real property; a sale of intangible
property; ... the establishment or maintenance of or contribution to a
custodial, trust, or escrow arrangement; a payment of a preexisting
debt; ... or the making or repayment of a loan."39 "Cash" is to be
construed to encompass coin and currency, as well as cashier's checks
(whether they are called "treasurer's checks" or "bank checks"), bank

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, UNDERREPORTED TAXABLE INCOME:

THE PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 34 (1983) (emphasis added).
33. Professor Morgan has noted:
Until recently, little attention has been paid to section 60501 outside the criminal
defense bar. In hindsight, it may seem odd that the organized bar did not mount
opposition to the original enactment of section 60501. The reasons for the lack of
opposition are the relatively obscure genesis of the statute and the apparent failure of all
involved in its passage to foresee the problems the statute would create for the defense
bar.
Morgan, supra note 4, at 942.
34. I.R.C. § 60501(a) (1994). Businesses subject to the Bank Secrecy Act, e.g., banks and other
financial institutions, are excepted from section 6050I's reporting provisions. Id. § 60501(c)(1)(B).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-1(e)(2) (1994).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1.6050I-I(e)(3)(ii).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 1.6050I-I(c)(7)(i).
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drafts, or travelers' checks.4" The expansive definition of the terms
"cash" and "transaction" is designed to cast a wide net, bringing a greater

number of transactions within the scope of review. Thus, any combination of cash or monetary instruments totaling $10,000 in almost any type
of commercial
exchange will trigger an obligation to make a report to the
4*
IRS.
The regulations also address the problem of structuring transactions.
Thus, a series of payments, which in themselves do not total $10,000, are
reportable if they amount to $10,000 in the aggregate and are made

pursuant to a single transaction within one year.42 The regulations
further prevent parties from breaking a deal down into several smaller
transactions in an attempt to avoid the reporting requirements; a recipient
is required to report "related transactions" if he "knows or has reason to
know that each transaction is one of a series of connected transactions. 43 Engaging in a series of "related transactions" without filing

Form 8300 would not only run afoul of section 60501's reporting
requirements, but might also violate statutes prohibiting the "structuring"
of transactions in an attempt to willfully cause a business to fail to file
a currency transaction report. 4

40. Id. § 1.6050I-l(c)(1)(ii)(A), (B). Travelers' checks are considered cash only in what is
defined as a "designated reporting transaction," i.e., a transaction involving the sale of a consumer
durable, a collectible, or a travel or entertainment activity. Id. § 1.60501-l(c)(1)(iii). For transactions
occurring prior to February 3, 1992, the definition of "cash" was limited to "coin and currency of
the United States or of any other country." Id. § 1.60501-l(c)(1)(i). The change in definition was
designed to expand the number and types of reportable transactions, thus allowing the IRS to cast
a wider net.
41. The regulations do provide for a number of important exceptions, however. Thus, a
cashier's check or money order is not treated as cash if it constitutes the proceeds of a loan from
a bank. Id. § 1.60501-l(c)(1)(iv). Similar exceptions apply in certain installment sales contracts or
down payment plans. IL § 1.6050I-1(c)(1)(v), (vi).
42. Id. § 1.60501-1(b).
43. Id. § 1.60501-1(c)(7)(ii).
44. I.R.C. § 6050I(f)(2) provides for both criminal and civil penalties to be assessed against
any person who "cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause a trade or business to fail to file a return." I.R.C.
§ 60501(f)(1)(A) (1994). The provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5313 require financial institutions-which
are otherwise exempt from the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 60501-to file "currency transaction
reports" whenever they receive cash deposits in excess of $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994).
Extensive litigation has arisen over various attempts to define "structuring." Ratzlafv. United States,
114 S. Ct. 655 (1994) (discussing "willfulness" requirement of structuring law); United States v.
Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994); United States v. Schmidt, 947
F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1004 (1989); United States v. Alston, 1994 WL 116046 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 1994). Federal prosecutors
have also begun to charge the failure to file Form 8300 as an offense in itself when prosecuting
more significant crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Palazzolo, 73 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1995) (table case,
full opinion available at 1995 WL 764416) (coin shop owner convicted of conspiracy and failure to
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Failure to make a proper return subjects a non-filer to severe
penalties.4 5 Section 6721 provides for two types of penalties for a party
failing to properly file Form 8300. A recipient is subject to a $50 fine for
each return where the failure to file was negligent, or where the return
either omitted required information or contained incorrect data.46 Where
the failure to make a proper return was due to "intentional disregard of
the filing requirement," however, the recipient may be subject to a fine
to the extent the
of at least $25,000 or the amount of cash received
47
amount of such cash does not exceed $100,000.
E. Application of Section 60501 to Attorneys

Section 6050I's reporting requirements directly impact the way in
which some lawyers receive fees from clients. Because lawyers have long
been considered to be engaged in a "trade or business" '48 for purposes
of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 attorneys appear to be covered by the
literal terms of the statute. Nevertheless, in promulgating temporary
regulations under section 60501, the IRS initially contemplated the
possibility that the attorney-client privilege might prevent attorneys from
making the required disclosures."0 Rather than promulgating an attorney-client exception, however, the IRS flatly rejected any idea that

file Form 8300); United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 1995) (car salesman convicted of
money laundering and failure to file Form 8300).
45. A cash recipient has a number of other responsibilities besides verifying the identity of the
payor and making a proper return. A recipient must also retain a copy of the return for five years
from the date of filing and provide a person identified as a payor with an annual written statement
notifying the payor of the filing. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-l(e)(3)(iii), (f) (as amended in 1993).
46. I.R.C. § 6721(a) (1994). The maximum amount that can be assessed in any calendar year
under this subsection is $250,000. Id. § 6721(a)(1).
47. Id. § 6721(e). The $250,000 annual limit does not apply to penalties assessed under this
subsection. Id. § 6721(e)(3)(A). I.R.C. § 6722 provides for a $50 penalty for failure to file a correct
statement for persons identified as payees in a Form 8300. Id. § 6722(a), (b). I.R.C. § 6723 provides
an identical set of penalties for failing to file on time. Id. § 6723.
48. I.R.C. § 162.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir. 1991)
("The practice of law is treated as a 'trade or business' under both the income tax laws and the
Sherman Act.' (citations omitted)).
50. In contemplating an exception, the IRS stated that:
Although these temporary regulations require attorneys to report with respect to the
receipt of cash in excess of $10,000, the Service will entertain comments from the legal
community concerning the possibility of developing an exception to the reporting
requirement for information on transactions which mightfallwithin the scope of the attorney-clientprivilege.
50 Fed. Reg. 21,239, 21,240 (1985) (codified as amended at Treas. Reg. § 1.60501) (emphasis
added).
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lawyers should be treated differently than others subject to section
60501.5" As a result, the final regulations included within the scope of
the reporting provision the following example:
An attorney agrees to represent a client in a criminal case with the
attorney's fee to be determined on an hourly basis. In the first month
in which the attorney represents the client, the bill for the attorney's
services comes to $8,000 which the client pays in cash. In the second
month in which the attorney represents the client, the bill for the
attorney's services comes to $4,000, which the client again pays in
cash. The aggregate amount of cash paid ($12,000) relates to a single
transaction... and the receipt of cash must be reported under this
section."
Thus, an attorney would be required to file Form 8300 whenever he or
she has received cash or other monetary instruments in amounts
exceeding $10,000. This would include payments made over a period of
time, even though no single payment itself exceeds the $10,000 limit.
The IRS's rejection of the attorney-client privilege led the American
Bar Association Grand Jury Committee to seek relief from the Tax
Division of the Department of Justice, which represents the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the federal courts. The Department of Justice
took the position that it was not empowered to provide an attorney-client
exception, although it would proceed cautiously in pursuing summons
enforcement actions against attorneys.53

51. In the preamble, the IRS firmly closed the door on an attorney exception:
Another commentator recommended that a criminal defense attorney who knows that a

specified monetary instrument received from a client is being used in an attempt to avoid
the reporting of the transaction should be excepted from reporting where the attorney's
knowledge is derived from communications with the client. The Service is concerned that
such a regulatory exception, however limited in scope, would have the effect of
encouraging the use of monetary instruments in lieu of currency to avoid the currency
reporting rules. Therefore, no exception is provided in the final regulations.
56 Fed. Reg. 57,974, 57,976 (1991) (codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.60501 (as amended in 1993)).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-l(c)(7)(iii) (example 2) (as amended in 1993).
53. The Justice Department responded to the ABA as follows:
Because Congress expressly delegated authority to the Treasury Department to
promulgate regulations delineating the statute's reporting requirements and the statutory
exceptions, these regulations are not simply one agency's interpretation of what Congress
intended the statute to mean. They are legislative regulations entitled to considerable
weight in the courts, and, unless inconsistent with the statute, have the "force and effect
of law."
The Justice Department, on the other hand, is not mentioned in Section 60501 as
having authority to create exceptions to the statute's reporting requirements. Nevertheless,
your Committee's guideline proposal calls upon the Department to delineate cases in
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Compliance Problems

As with the Bank Secrecy Act's reporting provisions, section 60501
was plagued from its outset with poor compliance. In 1990, the Treasury
Department and the IRS acknowledged severe compliance problems,
similar to those encountered with CTRs.5 4 In addition, the Treasury
Department found that section 60501 presented different problems
because it applied to all trades and businesses compared with the limited
number of regulated businesses subject to the CTR requirements."
Furthermore, the IRS was only able to measure compliance by small
corporate taxpayers; large corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships escaped scrutiny altogether.16 Examination of the sample returns
showed that small corporations complied with the filing requirements
only forty-two percent of the time."
which the reporting requirements would effectively be abrogated through a lack of
enforcement. But we agree with the conclusions reached by the Treasury Department in
the final regulations and are not persuaded that formulating cash reporting exemptions
for certain classes of lawyers would be a good policy or fair to others covered by the
statue [sic]. We do not, therefore, believe it appropriate to attempt to create reporting
exceptions by doing indirectly what the statute and the regulations so plainly decline to
do.
Although we decline to adopt guidelines along the lines your Committee has
suggested, we nevertheless intend carefully to evaluate and exercise sound judgement in
determining which cases should be selected for summons enforcement actions.
Business Community's Compliance with FederalMoney Laundering Statutes: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House ofRepresentatives Comm. on Ways and Means, 10 1st Cong.,
2d Sess. 203-04 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing:Business Community's Compliance] (Letter from James
A. Bruton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, to Michael S. Ross, Chairperson, ABA
Grand Jury Committee (citations omitted)).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
55. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, OPERATION OF SECTION 60501 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE: A STUDY CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 11318 OF THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECON-

CILIATION ACT OF 1990, 5 (1991) [hereinafter IRS SECTION 60501 REPORT].
56. The IRS gathered its data from the most recent Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program ("TCMP"), which was composed of 19,000 small corporate tax returns (less than $10
million in assets). Id.
57. The congressionally mandated study set out the following results:
The number of Forms 8300 filed voluntarily by the corporations in the sample
[out of 19,000] was 2,728. The results of the examinations of the sampled corporations
indicated that the number of Forms 8300 that were required to be filed was 6,437.
Therefore, the rate of compliance for filing Forms 8300 was 42 percent.
The amount of currency reported on the Forms 8300 filed by corporations in the
sample population was $97,365,674. The results of the examinations revealed that the
amount required to be reported was $259,304,815. Therefore, the compliance rate for
dollar amounts was 38 percent.
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G.

Use of Section 60501 in Law Enforcement

The currency reporting provisions of section 60501 have undergone
a "metamorphosis from the section's original purpose of correcting the
increased occurrence of unreported income to its current status as a
monitoring mechanism for drug control enforcement.""8 Indeed, Form
8300 has simply become one more tool in the federal assault on illegal
activity of all types, not just unreported income. According to a report
by the General Accounting Office, Form 8300 seems to be of interest to
federal authorities primarily for its use in combating money laundering." The government currently devotes vast resources to identifying
and locating income derived from criminal activity, and while precise
figures are not available, federal law enforcement officials estimate that
between $100 billion and $300 billion is laundered each year. Narcotics
and drug traffickers are the largest utilizers of money laundering
schemes; but illegal activities, such as gambling and prostitution, also
make use of money laundering. The desire to hide the source of large
amounts of illegally obtained cash inevitably leads to multiple violations
of the tax laws.60
Many criminals face a common problem: How to dispose of large
amounts of cash without drawing attention to themselves. Consequently,
the methods used to launder funds can vary from extremely complex
schemes involving sham corporations to something as simple as
purchasing expensive commodities with cash in an attempt to legitimize
illicit proceeds. 6'
The government seeks to attack money laundering through currency
reporting for a variety of reasons. First, the larger the income from illegal
activity, the more vulnerable it will be to detection when attempts are

The number of forms 8300 filed in the three years subsequent to this survey has

increased. In 1988, 18,694 Forms 8300 were filed. In 1989, 23,835 were filed. And in
1990, 30,778 were filed.
Id. at 6.
58. Ellen S. Podgor, Form 8300: The Demise ofLaw as a Profession,5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
485, 487 (1992).
59. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE,
MONEY LAUNDERING: STATE EFFORTS TO FIGHT IT ARE INCREASING BUT MORE FEDERAL HELP IS

NEEDED (GAO/GGD-93-1 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

60.
61.

Id. at 8.
Id.
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made to spend the money or deposit it in a bank. Second, statutes

penalizing money laundering also attack those who profit from criminal
activity but are not themselves directly involved in the criminal

enterprise. Finally-and in some ways most importantly--"[m]oney
laundering investigations often identify other types of crimes that have
generated large amounts of cash."'62
The reports required by section 60501 and the Bank Secrecy Act are
kept in two different computer databases. One is used by the IRS to
evaluate tax fraud and evasion, while the other is maintained by the
Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
("FinCEN"), and is used by a variety of federal law enforcement
agencies for criminal investigations. These investigations go far beyond
attempting to attack the underground economy. Instead, they are used to

identify suspicious transactions that might indicate other possible criminal
activity.63 The reports are also used to "evaluat[e] the merits" of
potential criminal cases, which presumably means that FinCEN data is
culled for evidence needed to support already-pending criminal prosecutions. 64
Federal officials clearly view section 60501 as much more than a
tool to attack unreported income. Unlike currency transaction reports
filed pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act, Forms 8300 are considered tax
returns, and thus, the information contained in these returns is subject to
restrictions on their release. Under current law, tax returns fied with the
IRS may only be released to federal law enforcement agencies, although
state revenue agencies may obtain Form 8300 information for use in tax

62. Id. Federal efforts to track the flow of large cash transactions are primarily dependent on
five types of currency reporting. In addition to the filing requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 60501, the
implementing regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 require the filing of four different reports.
These include: (1) the Currency Transaction Report (IRS Form 4789), which is filed by a financial
institution whenever it handles a deposit or withdrawal in excess of $10,000; (2) the Currency
Transaction Report by Casino (IRS Form 8362), which requires reporting of cash transactions over
$10,000 by any licensed casino; (3) the Report of International Transportation of Currency or
Monetary Instruments (U.S. Customs Form 4790), which is required to be filed by any person
transporting currency or monetary instruments over $10,000 from or into the United States; and (4)
the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (U.S. Treasury Form TDF-90-22.1), which
requires U.S. citizens to report any financial interest in foreign bank accounts with a combined value
of over $10,000. See generally Mark F. Sommer, Disclosureof Currency Transaction Violations:
When, How, and What ifYou Don't?, 47 TAx LAW. 139 (1993) (providing a description of the
currency transactions disclosure laws and addressing the issues that arise pursuant to these laws).
63. Sommer, supra note 62, at 147.
64. GAO REPORT, supra note 59, at 12.
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investigations." In recent years, however, both the GAO and the
Treasury have called for wider dissemination of completed Forms 8300
for use in both state and federal law enforcement investigations.
Financial transaction reports required by the Bank Secrecy Act and the
Internal Revenue Code are a major part of the federal government's
strategy to combat money laundering. Increasing and facilitating the
sharing of this data with the states could greatly enhance the utility of
the data as well as have a marked impact on the effectiveness of state
efforts against money laundering. 6
Wider dissemination of the information contained in Forms 8300 will
likely result in their use by a variety of both state and federal agencies
for purposes wholly unrelated to the collection of revenues from
unreported income. Instead, tax returns will likely become the first link
in a criminal investigative chain. As a result, it seems appropriate to
question whether attorneys should be entitled to some exception for filing
so as to prevent the possibility that compliance with the terms of section
60501 will lead to an attorney becoming a witness against his client.
Ill.

DOES SECTION 60501 VIOLATE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE?

The IRS generally considers the currency reporting provisions of
section 60501 "invaluable" in combating money laundering. 67 As a
result, enforcement and audit activities have been increased in an effort
to encourage compliance. 68 Lawyers and law firms appear to be among
the main targets of this activity.69 At the same time, lawyers have not

65. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(8) (1994) provides that: "The Secretary may, upon written request, disclose
returns filed under section 60501 to officers and employees of any Federal agency whose official
duties require such disclosure for the administration of Federal criminal statutes not related to tax
administration."
66. GAO REPORT, supra note 59, at 23. Indeed, the Treasury's call for wider dissemination
is a repeat from its 1991 request. See IRS SECTION 60501 REPORT, supra note 55, at 15-16.
67. Barbara Kirchheimer, Cash TransactionReporting Down, Richardson Tells W&M Panel,
64 TAX NOTES 1645 (1994).
68. I.R.S. News Release IR-95-37 (May 3, 1995) (reporting IRS "consolidated compliance
effort" consisting of unannounced visits to antique and art dealers, auction houses, and law firms to
ensure they are complying with currency transaction rules).
69. Samuel J. Rabin, Jr., A Survey of the Statute and CaselawPertainingto 26 USC.§ 60501
(Form 8300), FLA. B.J., Aug. 1994, at 26, 33 (discussing IRS program to audit small businesses,
particularly lawyers and others who deal in large amounts of cash); see also United States v.
McGuire, No. 94-60648, 1996 WL 1373276 (5th Cir. March 26, 1996) (attorney convicted of filing
false Forms 8300).
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been lax in fighting back. In an increasing number of cases, lawyers have
refused to fully complete Forms 8300 when reporting large cash fees
received from clients. These attorneys usually fill out the Form 8300, but
exclude the name and address of the payor/client along with a description
of the transaction. They argue that disclosure of this information violates
their ethical duty not to reveal confidential communications between
attorneys and clients,70 or that divulging this information violates their
clients' Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.7"
When faced with a refusal to supply all the required information, the
IRS frequently issues a summons to the lawyer to compel production of

the client identity.'

Law suits arising from this enforcement activity

70. United States v. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. 729,733 (D. Mass.), aff'd in part, 65 F.3d 963 (1st
Cir. 1995).
71. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 188 (1994).
72. The Internal Revenue Code provides the IRS with extensive information-gathering powers
in seeking to determine whether a taxpayer has complied with his obligations. Id. at 596. In the first
instance, the Code permits the IRS to summon a taxpayer to produce "any books, papers, records,
or other data" necessary to permit it to determine whether any tax due is payable or owed. I.R.C.
§ 7602(a)(1) (1994). In other cases, the IRS might seek information from third party record-keepers,
it must comply with the provisions of I.R.C. § 7609. This section governs the issuance of
summonses served on a third party recordkeeper, rather than the taxpayer personally. Where the
identity of the taxpayer is known, the IRS must give that person notice that a summons has been
served to the recordkeeper. Id. § 7609(a)(l)(B). However, if the identity of the party under
investigation is not known, the IRS must comply with the provisions governing what is commonly
called a "John Doe" summons. Id. § 7609(f). In this case, the Government must obtain judicial
approval prior to the issuance of a John Doe summons because the unnamed taxpayer will not be
notified that he is under investigation, and thus, cannot object to the summons himself. Id.
Therefore,. a challenge to an IRS summons may take several distinct forms. Where the
subject of the investigation receives the summons himself, the taxpayer may challenge the summons
before an IRS hearing officer. Ritchie, 15 F.3d at 597. If this challenge is unsuccessful, the taxpayer
may contest the validity of the summons in district court if the IRS brings an enforcement action.
Id. Where the summons is issued to a third party recordkeeper, two additional possibilities exist.
Where the identity of the taxpayer is known, the taxpayer may begin a proceeding to quash the
summons after issuance and may intervene in any suit brought by the IRS for enforcement. I.R.C.
§ 7609(b) (1994). However, where the taxpayer is not identified, he may not seek to have the
summons quashed, but may intervene in an enforcement action. Id. § 7609(b)(2)(A); Ritchie, 15 F.3d
at 596-97.
As a result, where the IRS seeks information from attorneys or law firms about client
identity or fee arrangements, it must satisfy the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 7609. If the client who
is the target of the investigation is already known to the IRS, that client will be entitled to separate
notice of the summons' issuance and have the right to file suit to quash or intervene in an
enforcement action. On the other hand, where no client is named on the summons, lawyers have
often sought to have such summonses quashed where the IRS has not sought judicial approval for
issuance. Ritchie, 15 F.3d at 597. In general, such challenges have not met with much success.
Courts have repeatedly overlooked the requirement that the IRS obtain court approval prior to the
issuance of a John Doe summons and granted enforcement. Thus, in United States v. Ritchie, the
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have resulted in varying interpretations of the duty of lawyers to provide
information about their clients' fee arrangements. While the majority of
courts have held that client fee information is not protected by the
attorney-client privilege, more recent cases have questioned this result
and have held that attorneys may have a duty to withhold client identity
and fee information in certain circumstances. Adding to the judicial
confusion is a series of ethical opinions published by various bar groups
and state bar associations that also take differing positions on the
lawyer's ethical duties."
Much of this disagreement, however, results from an incomplete
analysis of the purposes underlying the attorney-client privilege and the
types of cases in which the privilege ought to give way. Moreover, the
courts have been especially lax in distinguishing between the different
situations in which the question of client identity arises. Instead, they
have generally treated the cases wherein client identity is requested as
monolithic, failing to note that client identity may be privileged in some
instances, but not in others. Thus, before proceeding to analyze the recent
judicial treatment of the controversy surrounding client disclosure in the
context of Form 8300, it is necessary to briefly examine the reasoning
behind-and the limits of-the attorney-client privilege. An examination
of the policy choices underlying the privilege will permit a more
principled analysis of the situations in which the attorney-client privilege
should give way to other, more compelling, governmental interests.
The primary effect of the attorney-client privilege is to prevent the
disclosure of confidential communications. The legal system appears

Sixth Circuit noted that a hearing held after the issuance of a John Doe summons satisfied the
requirements of the statute, "in spirit, even if not by compliance with the letter of the law." 15 F.3d
at 600. In other cases, the IRS has sought to avoid the problem of failing to seek prior judicial
approval for issuance of a John Doe summons by arguing that the law firm itself, in addition to the
unnamed taxpayer, is a target of the investigation. See Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469
U.S. 310, 324 (1985) (holding that a "dual purpose summons]" seeking information about taxpayer
and recordkeeper need only comply with requirements of I.R.C. § 7602); United States v. Blackman,
72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sepenuk, 864 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Or. 1994) (finding
that where the IRS has a dual motive, i.e., investigating affairs of attorney and client, John Doe
summons requirements are not triggered). But cf Gertner, 873 F. Supp. at 734 (holding that the
IRS's claimed investigation of law firm merely "pretextual" and mandating compliance with John
Doe summons requirements in future such cases, but refusing to require reissuance because summons
not valid in any event).
73. CompareFlorida State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 92-5 (1993) (advising
attorneys to withhold client identity and fee information because attorney-client privilege applied
when filing IRS Form 8300) with State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Professional and Judicial
Ethics, Informal Op. RI-54 (1990) (holding that attorneys are not ethically prohibited from
complying with IRS requirement to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000 be reported).
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willing to bear the cost of doing without such disclosures in at least some
circumstances. In others, however, the law has crafted exceptions or
limitations to the privilege. These are usually based upon some
jurisprudential or public policy ground and have the effect of limiting the
assertion of the attorney-client privilege where it would otherwise apply.
These limitations exist in those cases where it is thought that society's
interest would be better served by requiring disclosure of otherwise
privileged information.
To determine whether the attorney-client privilege or an exception
will apply, courts have been forced to balance the competing interests of
society against the right of a party to engage in a confidential relationship with his attorney. It is exactly this type of balancing process that
must be undertaken in any analysis of the controversy surrounding the
use of section 60501. Before determining whether the information
required by Form 8300 is protected by the attorney-client privilege, it is
necessary to first determine whether the information sought by the IRS
rises to the level of confidential communication. Even assuming payment
and fee information is privileged, it is then necessary to analyze the types
of situations in which the privilege has been held not to apply in the
past. Only by comparing the pre-existing exceptions with the type of
disclosure demanded by section 60501 can we begin to come to any
conclusions about the legitimacy of requiring attorneys to accurately
complete Form 8300.
A.

Justificationsfor the Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege as a rule of evidence has a long and
venerable history.74 In its most basic form, it prevents the disclosure of
communications made between client and attorney:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his

74. The privilege may be traced at least as far back as the reign of Elizabeth I and can rightly
be considered the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications. Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng.
Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577). The earliest justification for the privilege was based on "a consideration for the
oath and the honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehensions of his client." 8 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 543 (John T. MeNaughton rev. ed.
1961). Eventually, however, this justification gave way, because "[t]he judicial search for truth could
not endure to be obstructed by a voluntary pledge of secrecy." Id. Before the privilege could be
extinguished entirely, however, a new justification premised on protecting the client's apprehensions
in consulting an attorney was developed. Id.
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instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.75

Yet, the desirability of retaining the privilege has been subject to
debate for some time. Commentators simply disagree about the relative
value of using the privilege to prevent courts from obtaining information
about matters in hearing.76 The primary justification for retaining the
privilege derives from its supposed role in increasing the free flow of
information between lawyers and their clients." Only by protecting
client confidences, it is said, can we be certain that lawyers will receive
complete information and thus provide fully-informed advice: Clients will
be more willing to confide in their lawyers if they are assured that what
they say will remain confidential. Lawyers will then have all the facts
before them before rendering advice. Both lawyer and client benefit from
a legal opinion that is truly informed.78
The legal system also benefits when clients are encouraged to
75. 8 WIGMOmE, supra note 74, § 2292, at 554 (footnotes omitted).
76. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists,
66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980) (asserting that privilege does not prevent courts from obtaining valuable
information); Max D. Stem & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena
Problem and a Proposalfor Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783 (1988) (arguing that privilege
provides substantial benefits to legal system). Butsee Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, LegalAdvice
About Information to Presentin Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV.
567 (1989) (arguing that attorney-client privilege has detrimental effects on judicial process). Jeremy
Bentham himself strongly opposed the privilege, arguing that "the deterring of a guilty man from
seeking legal advice is no harm to justice." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 74, § 2291, at 552.
77. Jeremy Bentham summed up the modem justification for the privilege in this way:
When, in consulting with a law adviser, attorney or advocate, a man has
confessed his delinquency, or disclosed some fact which, if stated in court, might tend
to operate in proof of it, such law adviser is not to be suffered to be examined as to any
such point. The law adviser is neither to be compelled, nor so much as suffered, to betray
the trust thus reposed in him... because to betray a trust is treachery; and an act of
treachery is an immoral act.
But if such confidence, when reposed, is permitted to be violated, and if this be
known... the consequence will be, that no such confidence will be reposed.
JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473
(John Bowring ed., 1962).
78. The Ninth Circuit has noted:
The doctrine [of attorney-client privilege] is based on public policy. While it is the
great purpose of law to ascertain the truth, there is the countervailing necessity of
insuring the right of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one having
knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the former may have
adequate advice and a proper defense. This assistance can be made safely and readily
available only when the client is free from the consequences of apprehension of
disclosure by reason of the subsequent statements of the skilled lawyer.
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960).
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confide in their legal representatives. Ensuring the free flow of information allows attorneys to make reasoned litigation decisions. Claims and
defenses can be fully evaluated; and, having all the facts in hand, the
possibility of ambush is reduced. More importantly, encouraging the
client to provide even the most unfavorable information permits a lawyer
to make a full assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of a client's
case. Needless trials can be avoided where client information indicates
that settlement is a more prudent course of action.79
A number of other, more philosophical justifications exist for the
privilege as well. Some argue that the attorney client privilege is
important to protecting the "zone of privacy" that is a basic concomitant
of individual freedom."0 Others claim that the privilege promotes a
client's sense of human dignity. That is to say, if the client cannot
confide in a lawyer without confidences being revealed, the client will
run the risk of incriminating himself---effectively denying adequate
representation by counsel.8 Still others assert that the privilege is
necessary
to encourage a relationship of trust between the lawyer and
82
client.
B.

Limitations on the Privilege

Like most legal rules, there are exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege. While a client's confidential statements to an attorney
regarding the client's past misconduct are generally privileged, statements
made while seeking the services of an attorney with respect to ongoing
or future crimes or frauds are not.83 The rationale for this exception is

79. Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
307, 315-16 (1991).
80. David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformityand Confusion: Privilegesin FederalCourt
Today, 31 TJL. L. REV. 101, 110 (1956).
81. Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservationofa Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many
or a CategoricalImperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 352 (1980).
82. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1062 (1976).
83.

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 195, at 367

(2d ed. 1994) (noting that all "reasons for the attorney-client privilege 'are completely eviscerated
when a client consults an attorney not for advice on past misconduct, but for legal assistance in
carrying out a contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud"' (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805

F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986))); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471
U.S. 343, 354 (1985) (holding that attorney-client privilege "does not shield the disclosure of
communications relating to the planning or commission of ongoing fraud, crimes, and ordinary
torts"); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (stating that privilege "takes flight if the
relation is abused").
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that "clients are not entitled to use lawyers to help them in pursuing
unlawful or fraudulent objectives."' Society's interest in crime prevention is simply greater than a party's right use to an attorney's services to
avoid his legal obligations." "If the privilege were to cloak such
would be loss of public confidence and corruption of
activity, the result
' 6
the profession."
A second exception exists for communications relevant to an alleged
breach of duty by the lawyer to the client.8 7 Thus, where a party
contends that his lawyer has acted negligently or improperly, the attorney
is entitled to reveal otherwise confidential communications in an effort
to vindicate the representation. 8 However, the exception to the privilege
exists only to the extent necessary to defend against the client's
charges.89 The justification for this exception is that the client has
impliedly waived the privilege by making allegations of breach of duty
against the attorney.9"
Courts have also found exceptions to the attorney-client privilege in
situations where the attorney is uniquely possessed of information
necessary to an accurate resolution of the case. Thus, where two parties
each claim an inheritance from the same decedent, an attorney may
reveal information communicated to him by the deceased where
necessary to determine the testator's intentions. The attorney may be the
only living person able to step into the shoes of the deceased client and
give evidence about the deceased's intentions.9 In addition, communi-

84. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 83, § 195, at 367.

85. Id. § 195, at 367-68.
86. Id. There is a two-part test for determining whether the crime-fraud exception applies:
First, there must be a prima facie showing that the client was engaged in criminal or
fraudulent conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, that he was planning such
conduct when he sought the advice of counsel, or that he committed a crime or fraud
subsequent to receiving the benefit of counsel's advice. Second, there must be a showing
that the attorney's assistance was obtained in furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent

activity or was closely related to it.
Id. § 195, at 368 (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.

1987)).
87. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 83, § 196, at 374.
88. United States v. Glass, 761 F.2d 479 (8th Cir.) (claimed inadequacy of advice on guilty
plea), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 856 (1985); Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d
1190 (2d Cir.) (attorney charged with securities law violations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980).

90. Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) (client waives privilege
by attacking attorney's performance).
91. MUELLER & KiRKPATRICK, supranote 83, § 197; see also Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394,
406 (1897) ("[S]tatements made by the deceased to counsel respecting the execution of the will, or
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cations relevant to the validity of an attested document may be revealed
where the lawyer served as an attesting witness.9 2 In this case, the
lawyer is not only uniquely possessed of valuable information obtainable
from no other source, it is often assumed that an attorney who acts as an
attestor is not actually providing professional legal services. 93 He is,
instead, providing services that others, such as notaries, judicial clerks,
or even military officers may provide. More importantly, it is apparent
that attesting witnesses are expected to be able to testify about the
relevant facts concerning the document in question.94
The law thus recognizes a number of exceptions to the attorneyclient privilege. In creating these exceptions, courts have balanced the
interests of the judicial system in obtaining the most accurate information
against the need to protect the flow of information exchanged between
lawyer and client. Therefore, where clients seek out attorneys to assist in
the preparation or commission of a crime, courts have found that
society's interest in crime prevention outweighs the client's interest in
confidentiality. Similarly, the need to determine a testator's intentions
with respect to the disposal of an estate requires that confidentiality give
way. Public policy determines the ultimate validity of any claimed right
to confidentiality.
It is in cases where clients seek to keep their identities or fee
arrangements secret that other considerations arise. In these instances, the
balancing test is not solely focused on the need to protect existing clients,
but also on the impact that the denial of confidentiality will have on
encouraging others to seek legal advice. If client identity and fee
arrangements are not protected, some clients might be discouraged from
seeking counsel. The question then arises as to whether the value of the
information gained outweighs the cost of discouraging potential clients
from consulting attorneys.9" It is this balancing test that lies at the heart
of the controversy surrounding the use of IRS Form 8300.
C. Client Identity and Fee Arrangements
The case law concerning the confidentiality of client identity and fee
arrangements may appear hopelessly confusing at first glance. This is
other similar document, are not privileged.").
92. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 83, § 198.
93. Some assert that this is not actually an "exception" to the privilege at all because the
lawyer is not providing legal services and thus no confidential relationship arises. Id.

94. Id.
95. Goode, supra note 79, at 320.
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because courts have generally not been careful in making distinctions
between those situations wherein the government seeks to learn
information about a client already suspected of wrongdoing, and those
wherein the government is attempting to cast a wide net, bringing
heretofore unknown individuals under investigation. In the first instance,
the government may already have indicted a client for some crime, such
as drug trafficking. In such cases, the government often issues a
subpoena to that person's attorney seeking information about fee
arrangements. The issue here is not client identity per se since the client
is already a target of investigation; rather the concern is the level of
confidentiality that is to be afforded to the client's fee arrangement,
',specially where payment in cash may further implicate the client in the
alleged crime. 6 In the second instance, the government seeks the
identity of previously-unknown individuals who have paid in cash. Here,
the government has no reason to suspect these individuals unless their
cash transactions are reported. In these cases, an attorney's report of a
large currency transaction sets the investigative wheels in motion,
perhaps providing the first link in a future evidentiary chain.
Thus, arguments concerning attorney-client privilege are directed at
two very different situations, those where the government seeks payment
information about known individuals (fee arrangement cases) and those
where the individual paying in cash is not yet a target of investigation
(client identity cases). Section 60501 is more often implicated in the
second type of dispute, the client identity case, than the first. The cases
which have reached the courts usually result from an attorney's97
unwillingness to provide client names to the IRS via Form 8300.
Disputes about the fee arrangements often arise when the attorney has
received a subpoena from a grand jury in connection with an alreadypending criminal investigation. In these instances, attorneys resist
revealing fee arrangements because such disclosure may provide part of
the evidence needed to convict their client. 8
The problem with many of the opinions dealing with the confidentiality of client identity and fee information is that judges frequently fail
96. See, e.g., United States v. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. 729, 735 (D. Mass.) ("TMhere is a 'strong
probability' that disclosure of a large unexplained cash income could certainly be incriminating
evidence in [a] pending narcotics prosecution."), affd in part, 65 F.3d 963 (Ist Cir. 1995).
97. United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995) (attorney refused to complete IRS
Form 8300 on grounds that revealing client identity would violate attorney's ethical duties).
98. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990)
(attorneys held in contempt and placed in jail because they refused to reveal the source of payment
of their fees incurred during their representation of four defendants on drug charges).
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to take note of the distinctions between situations wherein the government seeks client identity and those where it is attempting to force an
attorney to reveal fee payment arrangements.99 By and large, courts
usually start their analysis of the issue of client confidentiality by
repeating the blanket assertion that "client identity and payment of fees
is not privileged information."'" This is because client identity is not
normally considered a confidential communication necessary to the
representation, but is rather a "preliminary matter bearing on the
formation and existence of the attorney-client relationship."' 0 ' Identity
is simply a matter of "business necessity," not a fact crucial to the legal
advice or issues. 02 In repeating this basic proposition, however, courts
have not made distinctions between the various types of cases in which
client identity or fee information is sought.0 3 The courts have, however, recognized at least three different exceptions to the general rule that
client identity and fee information are not privileged. These include the
"legal advice," "last link," and "confidential communication" exceptions

99. Goode, supra note 79, at 320 (asserting that courts not only ignore the differences, but
actually "appear oblivious to them"). Professor Goode notes that there are actually five different
types of cases wherein client identity or fee information is sought: (1) those where someone hires
a lawyer to make restitution anonymously, Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); (2) where
someone hires a lawyer to reveal the wrongdoing of others, i.e., an anonymous informer, In re
Kozlov, 398 A.2d 882 (N.J. 1979); (3) where a person has hired a lawyer to represent or post bail
for another, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990); (4) where
clients are already targets of investigation and the government seeks to know how the client paid the
lawyer's fees, Tomay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1988); and (5) where the lawyer is
asked to reveal the names of clients who received a particular kind of advice, In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981). Goode, supra note 79, at 322-24; see also
MUELLER & KIRKPATRmCK, supra note 83, § 192.
100. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 602 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 188 (1994);
see also United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 1995) (attorney-client privilege
"ordinarily does not apply to client identity and fee information"); Anderson, 906 F.2d at 1488 ("It
is well recognized in every circuit, including our own, that the identity of an attorney's client and
the source of payment for legal fees are not normally protected by the attorney-client privilege.");
In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (Newton), 899 F.2d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The identity
of a client and the receipt of fees from a client normally are not privileged.").
101. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 83, § 192, at 353.
102. Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Chemey), 898 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1990)
("Payment of fees is incidental to the attorney client relationship and does not usually involve the
disclosure of confidential communications arising from the professional relationship.").
103. Cf Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592 (IRS summons directed to attorney demanding names of
individuals paying in cash); Cherney, 898 F.2d 565 (grand jury subpoena to attorney requiring
identity of person who paid attorney to represent third party in drug trial); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F. 2d 1267 (11 th Cir.) (grand jury subpoena directed to attorney seeking
information on how client paid fees for use in tax evasion prosecution), vacated, 904 F.2d 1498
(11th Cir. 1990) (en bane).
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and are derived from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Baird v.
Koerner.'°
The legal advice exception applies "where there is a strong
probability that disclosure would implicate the client in the very criminal
activity for which legal advice was sought."' ' However, this exception
applies only where the person seeking the legal advice is the client of the
attorney involved. Thus, where the government seeks information about
client identity or fee payment, the attorney is required to allege that the
person paying the fees was actually the client.1 6 This exception enjoys
widespread support,187 but at the same time has been the subject of
0

extensive criticism.

The last link exception was largely formulated by the Fifth
Circuit."° It applies "when so much of the substance of the communications is already in the government's possession that additional
disclosures would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain

104. 279 F.2d 623, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1960). Baird was a tax lawyer retained by a general
practitioner to provide advice concerning certain clients' failure to remit taxes to the IRS. Baird
advised the general practitioner that the clients would be in a better position with respect to a
criminal tax prosecution if they remitted the past due taxes. In order to keep the payment of the late
taxes from being a signal to the IRS, the attorneys developed a plan whereby the general practitioner
forwarded checks to Baird, the tax lawyer, who then made payment to the IRS anonymously. On
receipt of the payment, the IRS issued a summons to Baird demanding that he produce the names
of the taxpayers involved. When Baird replied that he did not know the names of the taxpayers, the
IRS demanded to know the name of the attorney who retained him on the taxpayers' behalf. Baird
refused to comply. The IRS then moved to enforce the summons and the district court found Baird
in contempt. He appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 625-27.
105. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990); see also
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982).
106. The exception is inapplicable, therefore, to those cases wherein the government seeks to
determine the identity of a third party who paid fees for the named client. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981).
107. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Durant), 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gordon), 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); Tinari, 631 F.2d 17; United
States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979). The legal advice
exception was the primary basis for the decision in Baird itself, where the Ninth Circuit held that
an attorney was not required to disclose the identity of a client who consulted him regarding
improperly paid taxes when such disclosure would be tantamount to an admission that the client, in
fact, failed to pay all the taxes due. Baird, 279 F.2d at 630-31.
108. See, e.g., Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (Slotnick), 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986);
United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984), applicationdenied, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir.
1985).
109. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (Former 5th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
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of inculpatory events or transactions."'"
doctrine

°

Put another way, the last link

extends the protection of the attorney-client privilege to nonprivileged
information--the identity of the client-when "disclosure of that
identity would disclose other, privileged communications (e.g., motive
or strategy) and when the incriminating nature of the privileged
communications has created in the client a reasonable expectation that
the information would be kept confidential."'
The last link exception has less support than the legal advice or
confidential communication exceptions. It has been explicitly rejected by
at least one circuit and implicitly rejected by others when applied to the
question of whether fee payment information is protected by the attorneyclient privilege." 2 Moreover, at least one circuit has limited the last
link exception only to those cases where disclosure of client identity
would result in the disclosure of other privileged communications, such
as motive or strategy."'
The difficulties in applying the last link and legal advice exceptions
have prompted the creation of a third approach, somewhat vaguely titled,
"the confidential communications exception." This exception protects
client identity and fee arrangements when disclosure would "reveal
information that is tantamount to a confidential professional communication.""' 4 A majority of the circuits have upheld the application of the
confidential communications exception.' " The confidential communication exception is narrower in both scope and effect than the last link and
legal advice exceptions, and only applies when revealing client data
would be the equivalent of revealing the substance of confidential

110. Jones, 517 F.2d at 674.
111. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Newton), 899 F.2d 1039, 1043 (11 th Cir. 1990) (quoting
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir.), vacated, 904 F.2d 1498
(1 th Cir. 1990) (en banc)).
112. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1990); In re
Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1984) (questioning validity of last link doctrine); United States
v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 810 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Durant),
723 F.2d 447, 453-54 (6th Cir. 1983) (specifically rejecting last link exception), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
113. Rabin, 896 F.2d 1267.
114. Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1428 (9th Cir. 1988).
115. Anderson, 906 F.2d at 1488-89; In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Chemey), 898 F.2d 565, 568
(7th Cir. 1990); Tornay, 840 F.2d at 1427-28; In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum (Doe),
793 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe I1), 791 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir.
1986); Shargel,742 F.2d at 64; Durant,723 F.2d at 453; Osterhoudt,722 F2d at 594; United States
v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 11-12 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979).
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discussions. Thus, the Third Circuit upheld the exception in UnitedStates
v. Liebman,'1 6 where the IRS sought to force an attorney to reveal the
names of all clients to whom he had given specific tax advice. The court
reasoned that revealing the names of the clients would be equivalent to
revealing the content of the discussions between the attorney and the
clients.
One commentator has correctly noted that the three judiciallyfashioned exceptions to the general rule of non-confidentiality are based
on flawed assumptions. In the case of both the legal advice and last link
exceptions, the focus seems to be whether the disclosure of information
would incriminate the client."' This justification for protecting the
confidentiality of client identity or fee arrangements is fundamentally
incorrect. Lawyers are required to disclose client confidences in other
cases even though the likely result is to incriminate the client in the very
criminal activity for which the legal advice was sought. Thus, lawyers
have been required to reveal client confidences where necessary to
prevent a fraud upon the court or where the lawyer's services are sought
in an effort to aid an ongoing or future crime. 1 The result is that the
legal advice and last link exceptions "seek to protect what are presumptively unprivileged matters, solely because of incriminatory effect.""' 9
There is, however, no justification in either the case law or commentaries
for such a distinction.
Although subject to some criticism, 2 ' the confidential communications exception seems to provide the soundest argument for protecting
client identity and fee payment information. Rather than concentrating on

116. 742 F.2d 807.
117. Goode, supra note 79, at 328.
118. Id. at 329.

119. Id.
120. Professor Goode has noted:
[T]he communication exception is circular. It applies only if "disclosure of the client's

identity... would reveal information that is tantamount to a confidential professional
communication." Implicit in this statement is the assumption that client identity is not a
"professional communication."... Identity is said not to be privileged because clients
do not reveal it to lawyers for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services.
This, however, is probably untrue ....
...If a client reasonably believes that he must identify himself to a lawyer
when he initiates the relationship, it is difficult to see how this would not be a
communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services. Thus,
the assumption that client identity is not a professional communication, and therefore falls
outside the scope of the attomey-client privilege as a definitional matter, is mistaken.
Id. at 333-34 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Tomay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1428 (9th Cir.

1988)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

29

Hofstra Law
Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 2[Vol. 24:623
HOFSTRA
LAWReview,
REVIEW

the ultimate effect of the revelation, as the last link and legal advice
exceptions do, the confidential communication exception goes to the
essence of the attorney-client privilege: Only those communications
actually necessary to facilitate the rendition of legal services are
presumptively privileged. Thus, where a client sees an attorney after
having already been served or where he himself seeks to institute suit,
the exception would obviously not apply. But, where a client consults an
attorney to obtain advice about past criminal or legal difficulties, the
confidential communication exception ought to apply if revealing client
identity or fee information would have the effect of revealing the nature
of the matter for which the advice was sought. For example, a client who
believes he may have underpaid taxes might consult an attorney to
determine (1) whether he has, in fact, underpaid and (2) what should be
done about it. Were the attorney to receive a subpoena from the IRS
demanding the identities of all individuals who sought advice on
underpayment of taxes, the attorney would be justified in refusing to
comply. The client's identity should be protected because there would be
no way to reveal the client's name without also revealing the substance
of the representation.
Moreover, the assumption that a client who gives his real name to
an attorney when seeking advice implicitly waives any right to remain
anonymous is flawed. Most people who consult attorneys on such matters
would probably prefer to remain anonymous even to the lawyer. They
most likely reveal their identity only because the attorney insists upon
disclosure for administrative purposes; the lawyer wants to know where
to send the bill. 21 Where client identity is concerned, the confidential
communication exception applies with even greater force. This may be
particularly true where the subpoena is designed to cast a wide net and
is not specifically targeted at a named individual. Thus, a summons
directed to an attorney seeking fee information about a client already
under indictment for drug trafficking poses less of a dilemma for the
lawyer's ethical duty than a summons asking the lawyer to provide the
IRS with the names of all clients who have paid in cash. This is the
situation essentially presented by IRS Form 8300. Attorneys who have
refused to fully complete the form argue that revealing the requested
information would be tantamount to revealing the substance of a
confidential communication, especially where the client involved is
already suspected of being involved in drug trafficking or money

121.

See id. at 333.
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laundering. Where the client is not under current suspicion, revealing fee
information may provide the impetus for an investigation. Federal courts
have been inconsistent in their approaches to this problem.
D. The Cases
The most widely cited case dealing with the confidentiality of fee
payment and client identity in the context of section 60501 is United
States v. Goldberger & Dubin."2 This case involved a number of
lawyers who failed to reveal the names of clients from whom they had
received large fees in cash. The attorneys filed the appropriate Forms
8300, but noted that their refusal to disclose client identity was justified
by the attorney-client privilege. The IRS issued summonses requesting
the production of the lawyers' records, but the lawyers refused to
comply. The IRS then moved for enforcement in the district court,"2
at which time the attorneys objected to issuance of the summonses on
both constitutional and ethical grounds. Specifically, they asserted that
requiring them to disclose client identity would be a violation of their
clients' Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. After a hearing, the
district court issued an order enforcing the summonses.124
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted at the outset that "[f]inancialreporting legislation plays an important role in the economic life of our
country" and this legislation has a "high degree of usefulness in criminal,
tax, and regulatory investigations or proceedings.""12 The court also
stated that although lawyers attempted to have Congress create an
exception to the reporting requirements of section 60501 for fee payments
when the statute was being considered, Congress refused to do so. As a
result, the Second Circuit was quite hostile to what it perceived as an
attempt to "secure from the judiciary what their [attorney] lobbyists were
'
unable to get from Congress." 126
The court then dismissed the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
arguments out of hand. Relying on a number of earlier Supreme Court
cases involving the Bank Secrecy Act, 27 the court stated that the

122. 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. Id. at 503.

124. Id. at 502-03.
125.
126.
the cash
note 58,

Id. at 503.
Id. In fact, however, there is no evidence that the organized bar sought an exemption to
reporting requirements when the original bill was before the Congress. See Podgor, supra
at 505 n.143.

127. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-26 (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 17-24.
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protections of these two Amendments were not implicated because the
reporting requirement of section 60501, like those in the Bank Secrecy
Act, "target transactions without regard to the purposes underlying them
and do not require reporting of information that necessarily would be
criminal.' 28
The defendant lawyers also argued that section 60501 resulted in a
deprivation of their clients' Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This
argument is grounded in the idea that forcing attorneys to reveal client
fee information would unduly interfere with the lawyer-client relationship
and, in some cases at least, cause the lawyer to become a witness against
his client. The Second Circuit rejected these assertions noting that the
Sixth Amendment is intended "'simply to ensure that criminal defendants
receive a fair trial' and that in evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, 'the
appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the
accused's relationship with his lawyer as such."'129 The "essential aim"
of the Amendment is to ensure that the criminal defendant is provided
with an effective advocate, not to ensure that he will be represented by
the counsel of his choice. 3 ' Thus, if the attorney-client relationship is
damaged as a result of the disclosures required by section 60501, the
damage is self-inflicted.
Section 6050-I does not preclude would-be clients from using their own
funds to hire whomever they choose. To avoid disclosure ... they need
only pay counsel in some other manner than with cash. The choice is
theirs. None of the appellants has advanced 3a legitimate reason why
payment other than in cash cannot be made.' 1
The lawyers also argued that requiring disclosure of client identity
under section 60501 would conflict with the attorney-client privilege. The
Second Circuit dismissed this argument as well, first noting that "[t]he
doctrine protects only those disclosures that are necessary to obtain
informed legal advice and that would not be made without the privilege."' 32 The court recognized that in "special circumstances" a claim
of privilege might be upheld sufficient to bar disclosure, but it did not
specify the types of situations that would meet this test. 3 3 Although it
made reference to cases wherein incrimination would be a "'direct and
128. Goldberger, 935 F.2d at 503.
129. Id. at 504 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)) (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 504.

131. Id.
132. Id.

133. Id. at 505.
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unmistakable consequence' of the disclosure requirements,""13 it did not
elaborate further. Thus, it is unclear from the opinion the extent to which
forced disclosure of identity or fee information could ever impinge upon
the attorney-client privilege. This impression is buttressed by the court's
subsequent observation that "'even where the technical requirements of
the privilege are satisfied, it may, nonetheless, yield in a proper case,
where strong public policy requires disclosure.""'13 Given that the
claim of privilege in this case collides "head on" with a federal statute,
it must give way. It therefore seems that, in the Second Circuit at least,
the attorney-client privilege is abrogated simply by the presence of a
statute, regardless of whether the implications of the statute on the
privilege were ever considered in the first place.
What is most interesting about the Goldberger opinion is that it
never discusses the three common exceptions to the general rule of
disclosure. No specific mention is ever made of the legal advice, last
link, or confidential communication exceptions, issues which other courts
have wrestled with in a variety of contexts. 3 6 Although the Second
Circuit did hint at the possibility that disclosure might provide a direct
link to incrimination,137 it did not really consider whether this "direct
link" is similar or identical to the last link doctrine discussed by other
courts. The initial effect of the Goldberger decision, therefore, is to
entirely foreclose any claim of attorney-client privilege.
The Second Circuit's reasoning has been adopted by other circuits
as well. In United States v. Leventhal,3 ' the Eleventh Circuit held that
the attorney-client privilege did not prevent an attorney from revealing
the names of clients who paid in cash even though the clients were
currently under indictment for drug trafficking. The court noted that the
last link doctrine would prevent disclosure in cases where "'the
incriminating nature of the privileged communications has created in the
client a reasonable expectation that the information would be kept
confidential."'" 39 However, the court rejected application of the last link
exception to the general rule of non-confidentiality on the grounds that
the pending indictments signified that prosecutors were already aware of
134. Id. (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1968)).
135. Id. (quoting Priest v. Hennessy, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986 (N.Y. 1980)).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 104-16.
137. Goldberger,935 F.2d at 505.
138. 961 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1992).
139. Id. at 940 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (Newton), 899 F.2d 1039, 1043
(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin) 896 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1lth Cir.),
vacated, 904 F.2d 1498 (1990) (en bane))).
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the clients' illegal activities. Disclosure of the names would not,
therefore, provide the "last link"
in an evidentiary chain leading to the
40
incrimination of the clients.
More recently, however, other courts have permitted attorneys to
refuse to comply with IRS subpoenas issued in response to the filing of
incomplete Forms 8300. In United States v. Sindel,141 the Eighth
Circuit held that an attorney might refrain from disclosing client identity
because such disclosure would result in revealing the substance of a
confidential communication. The court adhered to the basic reasoning set
forth in Goldberger, but examined the attorney's testimony about his
dealings with one of his clients in camera and concluded that the
confidential communication exception would apply to prevent disclosure. 42 While the specific grounds of the decision are masked by the
fact that the court took testimony in camera, the case provides some
evidence that the confidential communications exception is alive, if only
applicable in rare circumstances.
The most recent case addressing this problem was decided by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Blacknan.4 3 The IRS served a
summons on Blackman, an attorney, requesting information necessary to
complete several Forms 8300. Blackman filed the forms indicating the
receipt of large amounts of cash from clients, but refused to provide the
clients' identities. When the attorney refused to comply with the
summons, the IRS sought enforcement in the district court. The lower
court issued an order enforcing the summons, and Blackman appealed.'"
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order observing at the
outset that "[a]s a general rule, client identity and the nature of the fee
arrangement between attorney and client are not protected from
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege."'4 5 It then recognized the
continuing existence of the confidential communication and last link

140. Id. at 940-41 (citing Newton, 899 F.2d at 1043).
141. 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995).
142. Id. at 876. The court also held that disclosure of another client's identity was proper since
no special circumstances existed. Id. at 877; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Chemey), 898
F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990) (disclosure of client identity in response to grand jury subpoena not
required because of "special circumstances").
143. 72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).

144. Id. at 1421.
145. Id. at 1424.
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exceptions to the general rule. 46 Next, the court held that the last link
exception did not apply in the case at bar because "there is no evidence
that any of Blackman's clients who are implicated in this dispute are
currently the subject of ongoing investigation."' 4 7 In so doing, the court
followed the same line of reasoning as earlier cases in recognizing the
privilege that is based
validity of an exception to the attorney-client
48
exclusively on an incrimination rationale.1
The only basis for an exception available to Blackman, therefore,
was the confidential communications exception. Under this test, an
attorney may refuse to provide information only when "'the fee-payer's
identity and the fee arrangements are so intertwined with confidential
communications that revealing either.., would be tantamount to
revealing a privileged communication."' "14 1 Unable to meet this test,
Blackman's claim of privilege failed.'
Some lower courts seem even more willing to adopt a broader
interpretation of an attorney's duties in these cases. InUnited States v.
Monnat,"' a district court in Kansas concluded that it was bound to
follow the reasoning laid down by other federal courts when presented
with cases where attorneys seek to avoid disclosing the names of clients
paying in cash. The court reluctantly agreed that the caselaw to date did
not permit the attorney to refuse to disclose client identity, but it was
troubled by the implications for the attorney-client relationship if client
identity could not be protected:
The problem here is with the court's own perceptions as to what is

146. Id. ("[WMe have recognized limited exceptions to this rule where disclosure would
compromise confidential communications between attorney and client or constitute the 'last link' in
an existing chain of evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment.").

147. Id.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. 729, 736-37 (D. Mass.), affd in part, 65

F.3d 963 (Ist Cir. 1995).
149. Blaclanan,72 F.3d at 1425 (alteration in original) (quoting Rails v. United States, 52 F.3d
223, 226 (9th Cir. 1995)).
150. Blaclanan does raise two other interesting points, however. First, Blackman seems to

question the Second Circuit's statement in Goldberger,that the enactment ofIRC § 60501 abrogated
the attorney-client privilege. 72 F.3d at 1425-26; see also United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C.,
935 F.2d 501,505 (2d Cir. 1991) (asserting that "the attorney-client privilege doctrine collides head
on with a federal statute [section 60501] that implicitly precludes its application"). Second, Blaclnan
follows the lead of other cases and asserts that "[a]ttorneys should inform clients proffering cash in
excess of S10,000 for fees that they will normally be obliged to disclose fee-payer identity and the
nature of the fee arrangement in filing Form 8300." 72 F.3d at 1425. Such advice seems overly
simplistic, since any reasonably aggressive U.S. attorney could regard such a practice as an attempt
to avoid the reporting requirements and engage in "structuring." See supra note 44.
151. 853 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Kan. 1994).
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expected of the attorney in the exercise of his professional role. In the
court's view, this Act [section 60501], these decisions, and the
reasoning therefore fly in the face of what an attorney's role is all
about. The attorney is not expected to confer with a client as in a
commercial venture. The client's role is more than that; indeed, it is
more than even a fiduciary relationship in its highest mode. It is a
relationship different from any other in our society, save for the
confessor or physician. In the court's view, it is a sacred trust and
should not be intruded in. In this regard, it seems that lawyers, unlike
any others, are duty-bound to preserve that trust, as they, unlike others,
are bound by canons of ethics geared to preservation of that trust.
Given such perceptions, this court is troubled with these decisions. The
attorney's ethical responsibilities are at risk. It is clear to this court that
if and when a client consults with an attorney, retaining him for
canons mandate that the client's very identity
whatever purpose,1 the
52
must be preserved.
The court then stayed the matter and referred the case to the Federal
Court Committee on Attorney Conduct, seeking an opinion on the ethical
issues implicated in the disclosure required by Form 8300. The
Committee prepared a report for the court and concluded that "[a] lawyer
does not act unethically by complying with section 60501 or an order of
court directing compliance because he is permitted to disclose otherwise
confidential information when he reasonably believes disclosure is
required by law or order of court." 15 3 Before the report could be
considered further, however, the parties reported to the court that the
matter had become moot.Im As a result, we do not have any idea how
the judge would have dealt with this difference of opinion. Nonetheless,
the opinion does raise some important concerns about the role of
attorneys that seem to have been overlooked in earlier cases.
A court in Massachusetts has expressed similar concerns. 5 5 Nancy
Gertner was nominated by President Clinton to be a judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Prior to her
nomination, however, she was a prominent criminal defense attorney in
Boston. In 1991 and 1992, she represented a criminal defendant who paid

152. Id. at 1303.
153. Jerome S. Horvitz et al., IRS Targets Attorneysfor Disclosure of Clients Who Engage in
Unreported Cash Transactions,66 TAX NOTES 419, 421 (1995) (discussing the report issued by the
Federal Court Committee on Attorney Conduct).
154. Id.
155. United States v. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass.), affid in part,65 F.3d 963 (Ist Cir.
1995).
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his fees in cash. Gertner filed Forms 8300 with the IRS, but omitted any
identifying information. The IRS eventually issued a summons demanding the payor's identity. Gertner refused to comply because the client was
under indictment for various criminal offenses. She claimed that
revealing the information sought by the IRS would serve to further
incriminate him. An enforcement action was then initiated by the
156
IRS.
Gertner made several challenges to the validity of the summons. As
an initial matter, she contended that the issuance of the summons was
improper because the government failed to obtain prior court permission
before issuing what was in effect a "John Doe" summons. 157 The
district court agreed. It found that the IRS failed to comply with the
provisions of the law governing the issuance of John Does summonses,' but held that forcing the IRS to reissue the summons would be
a fruitless exercise because Gertuer had no obligation to reveal the
identity of her client in any event. 59 While recognizing that most other
courts had held that section 60501 did not pose an undue burden on the
attorney-client privilege,"6 the district court here held that the attorneyclient privilege prevented Gertner from complying with the summons and
revealing her client's identity. The court first noted that section 60501
was "an important tool for the IRS to investigate cash transactions and
to uncover tax evasion," but then declared that an attorney may assert the
attorney-client privilege "when the IRS seeks disclosures regarding a
client who is being represented on currently pending criminal charges
and the disclosures
are likely to incriminate the client in that very
6
proceeding."' '
More than just lost tax revenues or the method of paying one's attorney
is at stake. The attorney-client relationship, during a pending criminal

156. Id. at 731-32.

157. See supra note 72.
158. Gerner,873 F. Supp. at 733-34. Relying on I.R.C. § 7609(f), Gertner argued that the IRS
was required to seek prior court penission before issuing a summons to a third party recordkeeper.
The government, on the other hand, contended that the summonses in question were not directed to
a third party, but were actually directed to the taxpayer in question-Gertner and her law firm. The
IRS claimed that it was primarily interested in determining whether the firm was properly reporting
its income. The court held that the summonses were really "John Doe" summonses and that any
claim that the IRS was interested in Gertner's income was "clearly pretextual." Id.
159. Id. at 734.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Leventhal, 961 F.2d 936, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935
F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1991).
161. Gertner,873 F. Supp. at 736-37.
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prosecution, implicates bedrock constitutional protections such as the
right against self-incrimination and the right to be represented by
counsel of one's choice. While the Court does not consider the
constitutionality of § 60501, these fundamental precepts must not be
ignored when deciding how public policy impacts the application of the
attorney-client privilege.
...

On balance, the Court is satisfied that, given the specific facts

policy
of this case, neither the plain language of § 60501 nor public
6
weigh against the application of the attorney-client privilege.' 1
The Gertneropinion raises several interesting issues. First, it is clear
that the primary factor behind the decision to protect the client's identity
was the fact that he was under indictment at the time. The court was
concerned to prevent the disclosure from incriminating the client. The
basis of this objection is not at all clear, however. As noted above, there
are three generally recognized exceptions to the rule of disclosure of
client identity, the legal advice exception, the last link exception, and the
confidential communications exception. 63 Preventing disclosure on the
grounds that it would further incriminate the client in a pending
prosecution does not seem to fit any of the exceptions. Instead, the focus
on incrimination seems misplaced; the Gertnercourt does not anywhere
explain why the mere fact that information in the hands of an attorney
having an incriminatory effect is privileged."6 Attorneys are required
to reveal a great deal of information about their clients even when such
revelations will have an incriminatory effect. 6 '
The Gertner court's emphasis on the fact that an indictment was
currently pending also seems strange. Rather than being concerned to
prevent the government from using an IRS summons to obtain the last
link in an evidentiary chain, the court seems to be creating a "further
link" exception. That is to say, the court appears only to concern itself
with the current indictment to ensure that the government does not obtain
further evidence against an accused. What is overlooked is the arguably
more meritorious claim of the person who is not yet under any suspicion.
Forcing the revelation of client identity in this type of case would create
the situation where the summons becomes the "first link" in the
incriminatory chain.
Finally, Gertnertreads very close to the idea that the attorney-client

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 737.
See supra text accompanying notes 83-94.
Gertner, 873 F. Supp. 729.
See Goode, supra note 79, at 329.
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privilege is somehow imbedded in the Constitution itself." 6 Some have
argued that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel combined with the
Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination make the
attorney-client privilege a "constitutional imperative."' 67 While not
adopting these assertions, the Gertnercourt implies that the relationship
between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the attorney-client
privilege is sufficiently close that constitutional protections must be taken
into account when determining how far a particular statute, such as the
one at issue here, may impinge on the privilege. 6 '
It should be apparent that the case law on the subject has been
something less than clear. Not only do courts confuse the types of cases
in which fee information and client identity are sought, they have failed
to adequately explain the applicability of the various exceptions they
purport to adopt. That is to say, while almost all the circuits have
adopted one or more of the three exceptions to the general rule requiring
disclosure of client identity or fee information, none seem to go beyond
the mere statement of the exception and provide guidance to lower courts
or the bar about what the exception entails. For example, while the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Sindel asserts that the client's identity was
privileged by virtue of the confidential communications exception, it did
not state exactly why that was the case. Granted, the testimony was
necessarily taken in camera, but the court still did not give any hint

166. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. at 737.
167. Stem & Hoffman, supra note 76, at 1806 (citing Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation
of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the
Adversary System, and the CorporateClient's SEC DisclosureObligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495,
510-11 &n.89 (1982)); Jeffrey Epstein, Note, BenefactorDefense Before the GrandJury: The Legal
Advice and Incrimination Theories of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 537, 547

(1985).
168. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. at 737. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, but only with respect
to the holding that the IRS had not followed the proper procedures in issuing the summons. United
States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963 (1995). The court of appeals made clear that it did not adopt any

portion of the lower court opinion discussing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege:
It is not entirely clear why the [district] court chose to grapple with these issues .... If

the court extended its journey merely to memorialize a further basis for its decision, the
additional holdings are surplusage and can be disregarded. On the other hand, if the court
ventured afield because it concluded that the government's bevue was harmless, the court
miscalculated

...Any way we look at the situation, the district court's views as to the
applicability vel non of the attorney-client privilege are not necessary to the result.
Consequently, we have no occasion to consider the correctness of the court's conclusions
on those issues.
Id. at 971, 972-73 (citation omitted).
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about what standards it thought applicable to determine when revealing
client identity would disclose confidential communications. 69
In Blackman, the Ninth Circuit went further and argued that it need
not go beyond merely stating the rule:
Our case law spells out the narrow circumstances under which feepayer identity and fee arrangements may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege. Only in the extremely rare case will the receipt of cash
for fees be so intertwined with the subject of representation as to
obviate compliance with § 60501. We are hard pressed to imagine such
a case, and decline to provide an illustration. 7
The result is a body of case law that is both confusing and
incomplete. Not content to hold that section 60501 requires disclosure of
client identity and fee information in all cases, the courts have attempted
to craft nice exceptions. They state broad rules, without providing any
standard by which such rules are to be applied. The result is certain to
be continued litigation with decisions being made on a case-by-case
basis.
IV. TAx ANALYSIS OF SECTION 60501

Although section 60501 is a tax provision, none of the cases
involving attorneys and Form 8300 have analyzed the issue from a tax
qua tax standpoint, or the IRS's power and actions in these cases.'
Rather, the emphasis has been on the attorney-client privilege. This part
of the Article presents a tax analysis as an alternative to that articulated
by the courts and commentators. In addition, it examines whether section
60501 and Form 8300 represent good tax policy.

169. 53 F.3d at 874.
170. 72 F.3d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995).
171. See supra part III.D. Perhaps this has been a case of segregating tax issues as a "selfcontained body of law.' Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to

be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994). Professor Caron argues that this view has
impaired the development of the tax code by excluding helpful sources from outside the tax law.
Moreover, the development of non-tax law has suffered as well by not always considering tax
issues. Id.
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Section 60501 as a Tax Provision

The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code fulfill various
functions. Some define the tax base, 72 while other provisions are
73
designed to ensure compliance with the substantive Code sections.1
Section 60501 fulfills a compliance role. As such, it should be subject to
the same analysis as other provisions of the Code.
As noted above, most Form 8300 cases arise as a result of Justice
Department efforts to enforce summonses against attorneys who refuse
to disclose the names and social security numbers of their clients. These
actions should be distinguished from the more familiar cases arising from
IRS audits of taxpayer returns, in which the taxpayer has the opportunity
to petition the Tax Court to determine any deficiency claimed by the
iSR.

174

The analysis begins first by examining whether section 60501
passes constitutional muster. It next discusses the role of congressional
purpose in interpreting section 60501. Finally, it analyzes the validity of
the IRS's actions with respect to section 60501 and Form 8300.
1. Constitutionality of Section 60501
Any inquiry into the validity of section 60501 must begin with the
question of whether the provision is constitutional. The Constitution
grants Congress broad power to levy and collect income taxes without
apportionment. 7 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
constitutionality of most tax provisions and has never required a direct

172. See, e.g., I.tC. § 63(a) (1994) (generally defining taxable income as gross income less
deductions). Subtitle A of the Code generally provides the substantive rules for defining gross
income, deductions, timing, and methods of accounting.
173. Subtitle F of the Code generally provides the procedural and administrative rules which
ensure that taxpayers comply with the substantive tax provisions. Included within Subtitle F is
Subpart B, which requires that certain informational returns be filed. See id. §§ 6041-6050N. Penalty
provisions for non-compliance are sometimes contained in the reporting provisions themselves, in
addition to the general penalty provisions contained in the Code for failure to file returns. See, e.g.,
id. § 60501(f)(2) (providing criminal and civil penalties for structuring transactions); see also
Id. §§ 6651-6658 (containing general penalties for non-compliance).
174. See id.§ 6215 (providing for deficiency proceedings before the Tax Court). Taxpayers may
instead choose to pay the asserted deficiency and sue for a refund in either a U.S. district court or
the U.S. Claims Court.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.').
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revenue raising purpose. 17 6 Thus, while section 60501 is currently
primarily used as a law enforcement tool, and has a rather tenuous
revenue raising purpose, it nonetheless seems to satisfy the minimal
constitutional threshold imposed by the Sixteenth Amendment.
Although a tax provision passes general constitutional muster under
the Sixteenth Amendment, it will still be invalid if it conflicts with
another provision of the Constitution.17 7 Attorneys challenging section
60501 and Form 8300 have raised Fifth 178 and Sixth 179 Amendment
arguments. These arguments have been rejected without exception.1 80
Section 60501, therefore, seems to pass the minimal constitutional
inquiry for valid taxing power. Moreover, section 60501 and Form 8300,
as applied to attorneys, may not infringe upon clients' Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.
2. Congressional Purpose and Legislative History
Congress enacted section 60501 to attack and unearth the underground economy. As enforced, however, section 60501 has been used as
a weapon in the IRS's criminal arsenal. This section considers the extent
to which this deviation from section 6050I's stated purpose should affect
the validity of the provision, particularly whether such deviation would
allow a court to graft an attorney-client exception onto the statute. It also
discusses the relevance of the legislative history leading to the enactment
of section 60501.
Traditional rules of statutory construction of tax statutes dictate that
where a code section is clear on its face there is generally no need to
turn to the legislative history.181 Notwithstanding this traditional view,

176. 1 JACOB MERTENS, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 4.01, at 2 n.5 (1989).
177. As in other areas, the Supreme Court will avoid constitutional issues if at all possible. "The
courts will uphold a statute unless almost palpably unconstitutional, and will attempt to interpret the
statute so as to avoid constitutional questions wherever possible." Id. § 4.02 (footnotes omitted).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....").
179. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Id.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991).
181. 1 MERTENS, supra note 176, § 3.05. This obviously is the view taken by Justice Antonin
Scalia:
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many courts rely in part on legislative history.
A huge number of tax cases make some reference to legislative history.
Most do so as part of a broader contextual analysis. This approach
treats legislative history as one aspect-albeit sometimes an important
aspect-of context, together with previous judicial decisions, Treasury
regulations and rulings, and the overall statutory structure. Legislative
history is used to support a result that could very possibly have been
reached in its absence, by establishing the congressional purpose in
enacting a given provision. Often the argument is not that Congress
considered the specific issue in question, but that had it considered the
issue it would have decided it in the indicated way because any other
result would be inconsistent with the statutory purpose.' 2
From a textualist approach, section 60501 is clear and unambiguous;
the statute plainly applies to all trades and businesses and clearly sets
forth the types of transactions that are covered. Moreover, the statute
provides no exceptions for either trades or transactions. Thus, application
of the section to attorneys is completely consistent with the text or plain
language of the Code.
However, the statute was not intended as a criminal statute, and its
use as such, without satisfactory safeguards like a provision for attorneyclient privilege, is problematic. The IRS clearly seeks to use section
60501 for purposes other than those envisioned by Congress. The Service
believes that section 60501 has some usefulness in ferreting out other
types of illegal activity, and it has sought to allow dissemination of
Forms 8300 to other law enforcement agencies." 3 Therefore, there
appears to be some tension between the plain words of the text and the
purpose for which the statute is now being used. The contrast between
textualism and purposivism is commonly viewed as follows:
In the tax world, most see the tension between textualism and
purposivism as arising when a taxpayer wants a textualist approach and
the IRS wants to deviate from the textual, form-conscious approach in

According to Justice Scalia, texts are absolutely determinate. Moreover, the single
legitimate means of arriving at that determinate meaning is through a sterile parsing of
the statutory text's words. The "ordinary meaning" and "natural reading" of words as
they are "commonly understood" both begin and end the exegesis of the texts we call
statutes.
Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and the Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445,448 (1995)
(footnotes omitted).
182. Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretationof Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REv. 819, 851 (1991).

183. See supra part II.G.
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favor of a purposive approach. This perception is exemplified by the
hoary substance-over-form doctrine... under which the IRS challenges
the taxation of a transaction according to its form in184favor of taxation
according to the transaction's underlying substance.
While section 60501 is a tax provision, it does not directly raise
revenue. Yet, its non-tax character does not suggest the argument that
courts should interpret the statute any narrower than other tax provisions.' 85 Indeed, a stronger argument can be made that courts should
leave Congress to undo any mischief it has wrought. It has been argued
that courts should not lightly deviate from the plain words of a tax
statute simply because it has unintended consequences.
The Code includes many provisions intended to induce changes
in behavior, or effect wealth transfers, for nontax reasons based on
economic or social policy. There are times when courts are asked to
deviate from the plain meaning of the Code, by either the taxpayer or
the IRS, because the requesting party thinks the literal interpretation is
bad policy, even though not inconsistent with any structural attribute of
the Code. Because policy choices in a statute are the province of
Congress, courts should not.., deviate from a textualist approach to
statutory language when no structural value is implicated. A textualist
approach effectuates the policy choice made by Congress or forces
if its terms lead to results inconsistent
Congress to amend the statute
86
with the intended policy.
Even if a court were willing to consider legislative history and to go
beyond the text of section 60501, it would still have to determine that the
purpose for which the provision was intended differs enough from the
IRS's application to support such a departure. As administered by the
IRS, section 60501 is used to pursue money launderers, who are also
likely to be part of the underground economy. Thus, there is at least a
reasonable-if only attenuated-relationship between the provision's
stated purpose and the IRS's application. Moreover, lawyers present a
rather unsympathetic group of complainants, especially since the IRS has

184. Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose,2 FLA. TAX REV.
493, 495 (1995). Unlike the typical situation, however, it is the IRS that would argue for a textual
approach to section 60501.
185. The Code has long been used to regulate behavior in addition to raise revenue. See infra
notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
186. Geier, supra note 184, at 502.
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found lawyers in general to be poor candidates for compliance with the
18 7
tax laws.
In sum, the fact that section 6050I's application differs from its
intended purpose is not likely to help in invalidating or interpreting the
statute. While courts have at times been willing to look to the legislative
history and purpose of tax provisions and deviate from the text, such
deviations have been rare. 188 Moreover, non-tax provisions, such as
section 60501, are less likely to be judicially overruled.
B. Internal Revenue Service ' Regulatory Actions
Because section 60501 is a tax provision, the IRS is authorized to
administer and enforce the provision.'89 The IRS has promulgated
regulations, which are clearly consistent with the statutory language of
section 60501. Moreover, these regulations are "legislative regulations"
because Congress has specifically authorized the Treasury to promulgate
them." This section examines the validity of the IRS's actions in
promulgating the regulations as well as administering the enforcement of
section 60501 and Form 8300.
1. Validity of the Regulations
The courts that have held against attorneys challenging the validity
of section 6050I's reporting requirements have done so by rejecting the
asserted attorney-client privilege. Although no court has addressed the
validity of the regulations under section 60501, it appears the courts
might reach the same result by upholding the validity of the IRS's
regulations, which plainly provide no exceptions for attorney-client
privilege. Legislative regulations receive great judicial deference because
187. Sheryl Stratton, Attorney Non-FilersStill Targets in Service's "ProjectEsquire", 66 TAX

NoTEs 1596, 1597-98 (1995).
188.

Lawrence Zelenak, ThinkingAboutNonliteralInterpretations
of theInternalRevenue Code,

64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 624 (1986).
189. The Secretary of Treasury, and by delegation the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are

given broad authority to administer the federal tax law:
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other
than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and
regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal
revenue.
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1994). The Justice Department represents the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service in Article III Courts.
190. I.RC. § 60501(a)(2) (1994) requires that returns be made "at such time as the Secretary
may by regulations prescribe."
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they are specifically delegated power.'9 ' Accordingly, legislative
regulations are generally held valid so long as they implement the
congressional mandate in
"some reasonable manner,"' 92 and are not
93
arbitrary and capricious.1
The regulations promulgated under section 60501 are plainly
consistent with the statute. Moreover, the lack of an exception for
attorney-client privilege is not at odds with the statute. Neither the statute
nor the legislative history indicate any congressional mandate for
attorney-client privilege. Indeed, the problem is not that the regulations
are inconsistent with section 60501; rather, the genesis of the problem is
with the statute itself. In enacting section 60501, Congress gave no
indication that it intended to create any exceptions to the reporting
requirements. The regulations under section 60501 surely are valid as
legislative regulations primarily because they track the language of the
statute quite closely. The failure to provide for an exception for attorneys
does not make the regulations invalid. On the contrary, it might be
argued that including such an exception would require the IRS to
overstep the limited authority given it by the text of section 60501.
2. IRS Actions
Assuming, arguendo, that the regulations are valid, the question
becomes whether the IRS's administration of the provision is arbitrary
and capricious. 94 This is especially important given that the provision
is now used primarily for criminal enforcement purposes. An agency acts
unlawfully when it acts without considering a significant aspect of the
problem in the administration of the agency's program.' 5 As a federal
agency, the IRS is subject to administrative law, and its action is invalid

191.

Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); see also 1 MERTENS, supra

note 176, § 3.70.
192. 1 MERTENS, supra note 176, § 3.70 (citing United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307
(1967)); see also Long v. United States, 652 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1981); Siller Bros., Inc. v. Comm'r,
89 T.C. 256 (1987).
193. Interpretive regulations, on the other hand, are given less deference and must be reasonable
interpretations of the statute. See 1 MERTENS, supra note 176, § 3.72.

194. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,40-57 (1983)
(finding that an agency acts unlawfully if it takes action without first adequately considering a
significant aspect of a problem in the administration of the agency's program).
195. Id.; see also Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir. 1987); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1282 (1st Cir. 1987); Yakima Valley Cablevision, Inc.
v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Menorah Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 292, 29596 (8th Cir. 1985).
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if arbitrary or capricious.
It seems, however, that the IRS has not acted in an arbitrary or
capricious manner in its use of section 60501 as a criminal enforcement
weapon. In fact, the IRS's actions have been fully supported by
Congress.'97 But notwithstanding congressional approval of its actions,
the IRS's refusal to provide an exception for attorneys as provided in the
criminal money laundering statutes' 98 presents a serious inconsistency
at the very least.
C. Tax Policy
As discussed above, the IRS's use of section 60501, while problematic, is almost certainly valid. The ultimate issue, however, is whether
section 60501 represents good tax policy. While section 60501 is designed
to raise additional revenues by tapping into the underground economy,
it has clearly become something else-a criminal enforcement tool with
respect to money laundering and drug dealers. As such, its revenue
raising aspects have become far more attenuated.
The Internal Revenue Code has long been used for non-tax
reasons.'9 9 Economically and socially desirable conduct is encouraged
through exclusions from tax and an allowance of deductions. For
example, the Code encourages donations to charity by providing for
charitable deductions.2"° It encourages employers to provide fringe
benefits to employees, such as health insurance, by excluding the cost of
premiums from employee income.2"' At the same time, the Code
discourages certain consumption through disallowed deductions20 2 and
excise taxes."
Yet, the use of the Code for non-tax purposes necessarily affects the
vitality of the Code for its primary purpose of raising revenue:

196. See generally 14 MERTENS, supra note 176, § 50.103 at 333-34.
197. See Hearing: Effectiveness of Treasury Programs, supra note 1; Hearing: Business
Community's Compliance, supra note 53.

198.

18 U.S.C. § 1957(0(1) (1994) provides that "the term 'monetary transaction' means the

deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange ...

of funds or a monetary instrument... but such term

does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution."
199. 1 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SiMPwICiTY, AND
ECONONC GROWTH 1 (1984).
200. I.R.C. § 170 (1994) (charitable deductions).
201. Id. § 106 (exclusion of employer-paid health insurance).
202. Id. § 162(e) (denial of exclusion for lobbying expenses).
203. Id. § 5881 (excise tax on corporate "greenmailers").
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If all of the proposals to encourage some worthwhile social
activity through the tax system were adopted, the tax system would be
left a shambles, incapable of performing its primary function of
financing government equitably and with healthy economic growth. Yet
the tax system now contains many provisions that have little to do with
raising revenue and little to do with measuring income.2
The government has long used the tax laws to pursue notorious
criminals." 5 Moreover, the underground economy and the problems
resulting from drug trafficking and money laundering present major
problems for the country. Perhaps what is different in the cases involving
section 60501 and criminal tax statutes is that the former are criminal
statutes, perse, while section 60501 follows the pretext of being a taxing
statute and not a criminal statute. It seems to attack criminal activity
without affording those affected the rights and protections that usually
attend criminal sanctions. In overlooking the impact of section 60501 on
the attorney-client privilege, Congress has created many more problems
that it has been able to solve. Not only has there been poor compliance,
requiring a great number of enforcement actions, but it is also likely that
the financial impact of the legislation is a net loss. The government is
quite likely spending far more of its resources on enforcing compliance
with section 60501 than the provision is achieving for the Treasury. This
result is not dissimilar to Congress' attempts to regulate the corporate
behavior and the securities markets through the Internal Revenue Code,
which regulation has been roundly criticized.'06 Just as the Code and
IRS serve as poor regulators of the securities markets and corporate laws,
they are ill-equipped to curtail drug dealing and money laundering.
V.

CONCLUSION

The underground economy and money laundering present serious
social problems. But, in addressing these problems, Congress has cast a
wide net, including section 60501 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section
60501 has clearly become a major source of contention between the

204. Jerome Kurtz, Tax Incentives: Their Use and Misuse, 1968 S. CAL. TAX INST. 1, 5.
205. Al Capone was finally convicted and sent to prison on income tax evasion. David Laro,
The Evolution ofthe Tax CourtAs an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 17, 21.
206. See, e.g., Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the FederalTax Law in RegulatingHostile

CorporateTakeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail,40 U. FLA. L. REv.
789 (1988); Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutesand the Internal Revenue Code:
A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999, and 5881, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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defense bar and the government. Federal officials view section 60501 as
much more than a tool to attack unreported income. They seek dissemination of Form 8300 to a wide variety of law enforcement agencies on
the grounds that such distribution would have a "marked impact on the
effectiveness of... efforts against money laundering."20 7
The use of section 60501 as a tool in the war against drugs seems
like an expansion of its original purpose. This may account for the more
aggressive posture taken by the Justice Department in Form 8300 cases.
While this alone presents difficulties from a tax policy standpoint, the
problem greatly intensifies when the IRS pursues attorneys who refuse
to disclose their cash paying clients' identities. Despite the obvious harm
to attorney-client relations, most courts have refused to extend the
attorney-client privilege to section 60501. The resulting case law reflects
a confused and uneven state of the law.
Any consideration of the validity of Form 8300 must take into
account both the purposes underlying the attorney-client privilege and the
costs to the attorney-client relationship if the privilege is abrogated. As
noted above, the purpose of the privilege is to increase the flow of
communication between a lawyer and the client; and in order to
accomplish this purpose, some communications between the two are
protected from disclosure.0 8 The tension between "full disclosure" and
"privileged communication" can only be resolved when courts balance
the interests of the judicial system in obtaining the most accurate
information against the right of the individual to retain some measure of
confidentiality.2" One court summed up the issue quite succinctly as
follows:
Throughout their judicial endeavors courts seek truth and justice
and their search is aided significantly by the fundamental principle of
full disclosure. When that principle conflicts with the attorney-client
privilege it must, of course, give way but only to the extent necessary
to vindicate the privilege and its underlying purposes. The matter is
truly one of balance ....
20

207. GAO REPORT, supra note 59, at 23.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 74-82; see also Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30
(9th Cir. 1960).
209. Baird,279 F.2d at 631; see also United States v. Saccoccia, 898 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D. R.I.
1995) ("Although the privilege occasionally may deprive the Government of evidence necessary to

convict a criminal, that is the price extracted by a system of justice that places a premium on an
individual's right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
210. In re Richardson, 157 A.2d 695, 701 (N.J. 1960).
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Starting from the premise that the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to promote open communication, a resolution of the problems
posed by IRC § 60501 can only be achieved by considering the extent to
which leaving fee arrangements and client identity unprivileged would
deter clients from seeking counsel." If clients would still continue to
seek counsel notwithstanding the fact that their identity would not be
protected, then there should be no privilege. But, if disclosure would
prevent individuals from consulting lawyers, then the damage to the
attorney-client privilege caused by this disclosure must be measured
against the gain to the judicial process.2 12
The case law is rather consistent in recognizing that the attorneyclient privilege does not extend to all communications between an
attorney and client. Instead, it "protects only those disclosures--necessary
to obtain informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent
the privilege., 213 The general rule requiring disclosure of client identity
is limited by the attorney-client privilege where fee information is "so
intertwined with the matter about which counsel is consulted that the
threat of disclosure would deter the client from communicating information necessary to obtain informed legal advice."2" 4
Cases relying on an "incrimination rationale," and which prevent
disclosure simply because revealing the client's identity or fee information would serve to incriminate the client are fundamentally flawed, if in
fact, incrimination is to be the sole basis for preventing disclosure. The
focus, instead, should be on whether the information, if disclosed, would
reveal other confidential attorney-client communications. 2 5 The

211. Goode, supra note 79, at 336.
212. Id.
213. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
214. United States v. Saccoccia, 898 F. Supp. 53, 58 (D. R.I. 1995).
215. See In re Subpoena to Testify Before the Grand Jury (Alexiou), 39 F.3d 973, 976 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1825 (1995).
This exception to the no-privilege rule does not operate in every instance where
disclosure of the client's identity would incriminate the client or lead to indictment. "In
order to qualify for the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege, information
regarding client identity or legal fees must be 'in substance a disclosure of the
confidential communication in the professional relationship between the client and the
attorney."'
Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Hor), 976 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (Osterhoudt), 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983))); see also In re Grand Jury
Proceeding (Chemey), 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he fact that fee information may tend
to incriminate a client does not transform the information into a confidential communication, and
incriminating information which is not part of a confidential communication falls outside the ambit

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss3/2

50

19961

Harrington and Lustig:
Form8300
8300: The Attorney-Client Privilege and Tax Policy Becom
IRSIRS
FORM

problem with the attorney-client privilege in the context of section 60501
is that there seem to be few situations wherein the revelation of client
identity or fee information really results in the disclosure of a confidential communication. The majority of courts that have considered the
question have simply determined that in the balancing test between
requiring disclosure and the need to protect client confidences, the
government's right to disclosure outweighs the client's right to keep his
identity secret. Thus, an attorney does not violate the attorney-client
privilege by providing fee information to the IRS via Form 8300.
In so holding, however, it appears that these courts have overlooked
the special relationship that exists between the lawyer and client. But,
given the limited nature of the exceptions to the disclosure rule, the only
avenue available would seem to be a complete rethinking of the
exceptions themselves. A number of commentators have analyzed the
problem from this point of view and have concluded that some special
21 6
consideration ought to be given to the attorney-client relationship
Indeed, the Gertner and Monnat courts seem to argue this as well. Thus
far, two different options have been proposed: One focuses on the way
in which Form 8300 "undermine[s] the relationship of trust and
confidence that is essential between an attorney and client"2'17 and
argues that attorneys should be exempt from the reporting provisions. 1
The other concludes that section 60501 does not impose a terribly large
burden on the attorney-client privilege and asserts that no special
exception to the reporting requirements need be created for attorneys. 19
Neither option appears to address the interests of both sides,
however. Exempting attorneys from the reporting requirements fails to
take into consideration the government's justifiable interest in uncovering
the source of unexplained cash transactions. Continuing the present
situation, on the other hand, does nothing more than ensure that attorneys
refuse to fully complete Form 8300, producing a steady stream of cases
of the privilege.... [T]he privilege is limited to confidential communications.").
216. See, e.g., Eugene R. Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers, 43
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1165 (1992); Podgor, supra note 58; Morgan, supra note 4; Goode, supra note
79; Catherine A. Earl, Comment, Will This Be Cash? The Validity ofInternal Revenue Code Section
60501 and the Attorney-Client Relationship,21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 893 (1988); Adam K. Weinstein,
Note, ProsecutingAttorneys for Money Laundering:A New and Questionable Weapon in the War

on Crime, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., winter 1988, at 369.
217.
218.

Podgor, supra note 58, at 488.
Id. Professor Podgor argues that attorneys are exempt from the reporting requirements

because Form 8300 "requires the attorney to provide information on a specific client, thus entering
the sphere of the attorney-client relationship." Id. at 532; see also Earl, supra note 216.
219. See, e.g., Gaetke & Welling, supra note 216, at 1241-43; Goode, supra note 79, at 355.
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wherein courts are asked to determine whether the requested disclosure
is prevented by the three exemptions.
There may, however, be a two-fold solution: The first, and perhaps
least likely, possibility would be for the courts to create a "first link"
exception. While some courts have severely criticized the last link
exception, they usually focus on the concept of "incrimination" as a
justification for the exception. But, the real concern with the disclosures
required by Form 8300 is not that more evidence will be produced to
further incriminate the client. Rather, the primary concern should be
those situations wherein the disclosure will produce the first link in the
evidentiary chain. Given that Form 8300 is designed to initiate criminal
and tax investigations, the attorney who fully completes it actually jumpstarts an investigation of his own client. Courts could, therefore, limit
disclosures required by Form 8300 to those situations where the client is
already under indictment. That is to say, Gertner has it backwards.
Lawyers should not be exempt from revealing information about clients
simply because the information serves to further implicate them in certain
crimes of which they are already suspected. Instead, the courts should
review the implications of the Fifth Amendment on the attorney-client
relationship: Where the client is currently unknown to law enforcement
authorities, the lawyer should not be required to serve as an informant.
This analysis is, of course, based on the proposition that requiring
disclosures by attorneys is tantamount to coercing incriminating
statements from an accused. Admittedly, this solution will have the effect
of increasing, rather than decreasing, the litigation surrounding Form
8300 disclosures because instead of litigating three exceptions to
disclosure, lawyers would have four to litigate.
A second solution might be to craft a legislative exception to section
60501. This could be modeled on a similar exception in the money
laundering statutes, where Congress has already provided an exception
for "transaction[s] necessary to preserve a person's right to representation
22 Thus,
as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.""
lawyers receiving fees in cash from clients may escape liability for
money laundering offenses even though the funds received were the
proceeds of illegal activity. A similar exception in section 60501 might
have the effect of reducing many of the difficulties facing lawyers and
the courts. Such an exception might be structured with an eye toward

220. Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4354 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1994)).
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reliance on the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, disclosure would not be
required where completing Form 8300 would likely result in a criminal
investigation. Thus, section 60501 might include language to the effect
that "no return need be filed by a licensed attorney where disclosures
required by this section would infringe a person's Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination." One problem that arises even with this
solution, however, is that litigation may not be decreased in the short
term. Attorneys who fail to file Forms 8300 might still find themselves
subject to investigation by the IRS. Courts will then still be burdened
with having to determine whether disclosure would, in actuality, result
in the incrimination of a client.
Perhaps, the real problem with section 60501 is that it is misguided
as tax policy. A provision designed to capture a part of the underground
economy has become a tool in the war against a wide variety of crimes.
One problem that seems overlooked, however, is that the amount of
effort expended on enforcing section 60501 against attorneys vastly
exceeds the amount of revenue recovered through its provisions. It is also
unlikely that section 60501 has a significant detrimental effect on other
types of crime. In reports to Congress, the Treasury admits that there are
"substantial" cash dealings in the marketplace which are not reflected on
Forms 8300. In fact, both the Treasury and Congress acknowledge that
most merchants appear quite willing to not only accept cash without
complying with the reporting requirements, but go "out of their way to
suggest ways to structure anticipated transactions to avoid the reporting
requirements." 22 1
In the end, the legacy of section 60501 is one of unnecessary
confusion and waste. The government is devoting resources to force
attorneys to comply with the reporting provisions in cases which together
amount to no more than the tip of the iceberg. By the government's own
measure, compliance with section 60501 is abysmal. The section should
be drastically amended-or repealed altogether--so that federal law
enforcement resources might be deployed more efficiently.

221.

Hearing:Business Community's Compliance, supra note 53, at 2.
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